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Legal Pathways to Deep
Decarbonization
LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA AND GERMANY
John C. Dernbach†
INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2015, in Paris, France, the parties to
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change1—a total
of 196 countries2—unanimously agreed to a goal of net zero
greenhouse gas emissions by the second half of this century.3
† Commonwealth Professor of Environmental Law and Sustainability,
Widener University Commonwealth Law School; Director, Environmental Law and
Sustainability Center, Widener University Commonwealth Law School. Thanks to
Michael Gerrard, Gregg Macey, and Felix Mormann for insightful comments on an
earlier draft, and to Bo Bucher, Class of 2017, for helpful research assistance. Thanks
also to Jessica Schneider and Zack Goldberg at the Brooklyn Law Review for thoughtful
editing. Professor Dernbach can be reached at jcdernbach@widener.edu.
1 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature May
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), https://unfccc.int/
files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.p
df [https://perma.cc/YDT3-X4WZ] [hereinafter Framework Convention].
2 Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/
status_of_ratification/items/2631.php [https://perma.cc/BJ59-D495]. There are actually
197 parties—196 countries and an economic integration organization, the European
Union. Id.
3 “Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon
as possible . . . and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter . . . so as to achieve a
balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.” Conference of the Parties, United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, art. 4.1, in
Decision 1/CP.21 (Adoption of the Paris Agreement) U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.
1 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UL3P-FYE5]. The “balance” of emissions and removals means net zero
emissions. Kelly Levin et al., INSIDER: Understanding the Paris Agreement’s LongTerm Goal to Limit Global Warming, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.wri.
org/blog/2015/12/insider-understanding-paris-agreement%E2%80%99s-long-term-goal-limitglobal-warming [https://perma.cc/G9XY-EGDL]. Carbon dioxide, the most important climate
change pollutant, can be removed from the atmosphere by a variety of natural and other
processes. See Framework Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.8 (defining a “sink” as “any
process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of
a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere”). Decision 1/CP.21 has two parts, a decision by the
parties about implementation and an annex. The annex contains the Paris Agreement
itself. To avoid confusion with the Paris Agreement, citations to the decision will refer
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The Paris Agreement, as it is called, marked the first time
since the Framework Convention opened for signature in 1992
that all parties had agreed to such a goal. It was also the first
time that all parties agreed to take actions to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions.4 The only prior agreement even
remotely comparable to the Paris Agreement—the Kyoto
Protocol—did not contain an overall emissions reduction goal
and only limited developed countries’ emissions.5
For the United States, the challenge of achieving this
goal is enormous. While greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States are slightly lower than they were about a decade ago, the
United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases
in the world (after China).6 U.S. carbon dioxide emissions per
capita are among the highest in the world.7 The U.S. energy
sector is now heavily dependent on coal, oil, and natural gas—
which together are responsible for the bulk of U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions, mostly in the form of carbon dioxide.8 Any
comprehensive effort to address climate pollutants must also
address methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases.9
The United States has begun to address greenhouse gas
emissions. In the run-up to the Paris climate conference, every
country was asked to submit an Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution (INDC) to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.10 In
to Decision 1/CP.21, and citations to the Paris Agreement itself will refer to the Paris
Agreement.
4 Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic Climate
Agreement, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2015/12/12/proposed-historic-climate-pact-nears-final-vote/ [https://perma.
cc/4PP6-7EWG].
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 3.1 & annex B, 10, 1998, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add, http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AV5-ZUR7].
6 Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, https://www3.epa.gov/climate
change/ghgemissions/global.html [https://perma.cc/5XGD-XJBH].
7 CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons Per Capita), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC [https://perma.cc/34RX-LXTU] (showing U.S.
per capita emissions to be 17.0 tons in 2011, which is exceeded only by Aruba, Bahrain,
Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Oman, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, and
United Arab Emirates).
8 EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2014,
at ES-5–ES-7 tbl.ES-2 (2016), https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghg
emissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2016-Main-Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G8W-ZZQQ] (showing
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion to constitute the great majority of
overall greenhouse gas emissions).
9 See id. at ES-6–ES-7 tbl.ES-2 (showing U.S. emissions of those pollutants).
10 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/
8766.php[https://perma.cc/TZ5Y-B4CJ]. The INDCs would have had legal status if the
subsequent Paris Agreement required them to be achieved or included measures for
formally implementing them. DANIEL BODANSKY & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., KEY LEGAL ISSUES IN THE 2015 CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 3
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its INDC, the U.S. State Department said that the United States’
short-term objective is “to achieve an economy-wide target of
reducing its greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions by 26–28 per cent
below its 2005 level in 2025.”11 This objective, the United States
said, “is consistent with a straight line emission reduction
pathway from 2020 to deep, economy-wide emission reductions
of 80% or more [from 2005 levels] by 2050.”12 The United States
also explained that the short-term objective is based on actions
that had already been taken, or were about to be finalized,
including strengthened efficiency standards for motor vehicles,
household appliances, and industrial equipment; methane
emission standards for landfills as well as oil and gas facilities;
and the EPA’s Clean Power Plan.13 After Paris, the Obama
administration took additional steps that were consistent with
the overall goal of the Paris Agreement, such as a moratorium
on new coal leases on federal lands as part of a comprehensive
review of that program.14 Yet implementation of the Clean
Power Plan, which would reduce greenhouse gases from
electric generating facilities by 32% from 2005 levels by 2030,15
has been enjoined by the U.S. Supreme Court until all legal
challenges are resolved.16 Even with the Clean Power Plan,
however, the United States must double its pace in reducing
carbon intensity to reach the 2025 goal.17
The political future of the Clean Power Plan and shortterm U.S. decarbonization efforts are also in doubt as this
article goes to press because of the election of President Donald
Trump, who expressed skepticism about climate change science

(2015),
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-issues-brief-06-2015.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/86R5-UJGV]. The Paris Agreement did not do that.
11 UNITED STATES, COVER NOTE INDC AND ACCOMPANYING INFORMATION
(2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20
States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying
%20Information.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELE7-93JL] [hereinafter UNITED STATES, COVER
NOTE INDC].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Jewell Launches
Comprehensive Review of Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/press
releases/secretary-jewell-launches-comprehensive-review-federal-coal-program [https://
perma.cc/N68F-Y23N].
15 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units; 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,736 n.384 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
16 West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016).
17 Cristina Maza, Climate Deal to Be Signed Amid ‘Faster’ Global Progress, Moniz
Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/
2016/0420/Climate-deal-to-be-signed-amid-faster-global-progress-Moniz-says [https://perma.
cc/QU4S-7CE5].
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and campaigned against the Clean Power Plan.18 On March 28,
2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing
EPA to suspend, rescind, or revise the Clean Power Plan.19
Still, while the momentum for clean energy in the United
States—and thus decarbonization—might be slowed, it is likely
to be irreversible.20 This article is premised on the view that
decarbonization is both necessary and inevitable.
Achieving the zero-emissions goal requires answering
two questions. First, what technical and policy pathways or
strategies exist for the United States to achieve that goal? Second,
what laws are most likely to actually get the job done—both
because they are likely to work and because they are likely to get
enacted in the first place? These challenges are compounded by
the fact that the United States has little legal or regulatory
experience in conceiving and carrying out multigenerational
projects of this scale, moving intentionally from one state of
affairs to another.21 Policy continuity over many decades is also a
necessary ingredient to make the transition work,22 and climate
change has divided the major political parties in recent
presidential elections, including the 2016 election.23
An important clue to the answer to both questions lies
in the fact that some jurisdictions are further along in their
18 John Schwartz, Trump’s Climate Views: Combative, Conflicting and Confusing,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/climate/donald-trumpglobal-warming-views.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3MD8-RJRC] (summarizing various
Trump campaign statements about climate change and renewable energy); Chelsea Harvey,
Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He Might—and Might Not—
Succeed, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/11/11/trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-clean-power-plan-heres-how-hemight-and-might-not-succeed/?utm_term=.96fccce87cd3 [https://perma.cc/2MVK-VKTX].
19 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095, § 4 (Mar. 31, 2017);
see also Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,239 (Apr. 4, 2017) (explaining
how EPA intends to review the Clean Power Plan in light of the Executive Order).
20 Barack Obama, The Irreversible Momentum of Clean Energy, SCIENCE,
Jan. 9, 2017, at 1, http://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2017/01/06/science.aam
6284.full [https://perma.cc/S6S3-ZRKJ] (explaining that momentum is irreversible
because 1) its benefits are greater than the risks of climate change, 2) businesses have
concluded that clean energy reduces costs and creates jobs, 3) the costs of renewable
electricity are lower than those for electricity from coal, and 4) other countries and
businesses are actively engaged in developing and using clean energy).
21 John C. Dernbach, Navigating the U.S. Transition to Sustainability:
Matching National Governance Challenges with Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 93, 99 (2008) (identifying civil rights, trade liberalization, and the transfer of
federal lands to private landowners as possibly analogous).
22 Id. at 100 (identifying the Monroe Doctrine and containment of Communism
as examples of political continuity in foreign policy, and economic development and
prevention and reduction of crime as examples in domestic policy).
23 In 2008, however, both Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama and
Republican Party nominee John McCain supported federal legislation to address
climate change. The Candidates on Climate, 2 NATURE REP. CLIMATE CHANGE 126,
126–27 (2008), http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0810/pdf/climate.2008.100.pdf [https://
perma.cc/74QC-B3V7].
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thinking and action on this issue than the United States as a
whole. Two such jurisdictions are Germany, a separate
country, and California, a prominent U.S. state. Both have
economy-wide goals for substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050, and both have ample experience adopting
and implementing laws to improve energy efficiency, foster
renewable energy, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. While
neither has achieved anything like deep decarbonization
(reductions of at least 42%–57% in 2050 energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions, with an ultimate objective of having all net
emissions of greenhouse gases “approach zero between 2050 and
2075”),24 both are making a serious effort to do so. In the
economic realm, too, each is significant in its own right. While
the United States has the world’s largest economy, as measured
by gross domestic product (GDP), Germany ranks fourth and
California sixth.25 Because the economic impact of action on
climate change is both a major obstacle and a major opportunity
for the transition, it is no small thing that two of the world’s
leading economies are in leadership positions for that transition.
This article will thus attempt to answer this question:
What can the United States learn from the experiences of
California and Germany thus far?26 California’s long-time
leadership on environmental and energy issues means that
many California laws are eventually adopted in some form by
Congress or otherwise strongly influence the direction of federal
policymaking.27 At the same time, the similarities between
Germany and the United States—large industrial democracies
with federal systems and relatively high levels of energy use—

24 DEEP
DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION 3 (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
DDPP_2015_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/S44X-7748].
25 Paul Ausick, California Now World’s Sixth-Largest Economy, 24/7 WALL ST.
(June 15, 2016), http://247wallst.com/economy/2016/06/15/california-now-worlds-sixthlargest-economy/ [https://perma.cc/D9DH-ZD6C].
26 These are not the only jurisdictions that are farther along than the United
States. For a comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom on climate
change, see John C. Dernbach & Andrea Ross, The Sustainable Relationship: What the
United States and the United Kingdom Can Teach Each Other About Climate Change and
Sustainable Development at the National Level, in Six Easy Lessons, ENVTL. F., May–
June 2013; see also DECARBONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTERNAL POLICIES AND
EXTERNAL STRATEGIES (Claire Dupont & Sebastian Oberthür eds., 2015). A
comprehensive treatment and analysis of what the United States can learn from all other
leading jurisdictions would require book-length treatment, and that is not possible in this
article.
27 See, e.g., California Leads the World: Pioneering Solutions to Environmental
Problems, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL & ENVTL. DEF., https://members.e2.org/ext/doc/CA
Leadershipfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FXG-RHA7].
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have made comparative analysis of the two countries a fruitful
topic for energy and environmental law scholarship.28
Part I of this article describes the challenge of finding
appropriate legal pathways to achieve the zero-emissions goal.
Using long-term modeling and analysis of the various physical
and structural changes that are required, the Deep
Decarbonization Pathways Project shows various technical and
policy pathways to deep decarbonization in the United States,
Germany, and fourteen other countries, which together represent
74% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.29 What this project
does not do, however, is explain the legal pathways—the specific
ways in which law could guide, direct, and enable this transition.
Part II provides an overview of energy and climate law
in California, Germany, and the United States. Essentially,
California and Germany have achieved greater reductions than
the United States as a percentage of their overall emissions,
they have established more aggressive long-term and sectorspecific goals, and they have adopted laws that are directed
toward achieving those goals.30
Finally, Part III describes the many lessons that the
United States can learn from the experiences of California and
Germany in choosing legal pathways. Perhaps most
fundamentally, widespread public support and participation are
needed, in no small part because of the magnitude of the
decarbonization task. It is also essential to have a sustainable
development perspective in drafting and implementing laws to
address the social, environmental, economic, and security risks
of climate change, and to maximize the social, environmental,
economic, and security co-benefits of the actions taken.
To be sure, California and Germany are nowhere near
the finish line for decarbonization, and each jurisdiction has
experienced its own challenges and problems. Additional
28 See, e.g., Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the
Renewable Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 55 (2016); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A
Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1588–89 (1994).
Mainstream media sources also point to what the United States can learn about a
clean energy future from California and Germany. See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, California
May Be a Leader on Climate Change, But It Still Has Plenty of Work to Do, GRIST (Nov.
28, 2015), http://grist.org/climate-energy/california-may-be-a-leader-on-climate-changebut-it-still-has-plenty-of-work-to-do/ [https://perma.cc/Z246-9AC3] (“California is often
cited as an international example of what is possible on climate, alongside powerhouses
like Germany.”); Robert Kunzig, Germany Could Be a Model for How We’ll Get Power in
the Future, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.
com/2015/11/climate-change/germany-renewable-energy-revolution-text
[https://perma.cc/KVH9-S8NU].
29 DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, supra note 24, at 3.
30 See infra Part II.
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problems no doubt await each. Still, given the magnitude of the
climate change challenge confronting the United States (and
other countries), as well as the obvious political challenges, it is
essential to mine the experiences of those leading the effort.
I.

FINDING APPROPRIATE LEGAL PATHWAYS TO ACHIEVE
DEEP DECARBONIZATION

A.

The Urgency of Climate Change and the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement, as already noted, is built on the
INDCs that countries submitted in the run-up to the Paris
conference. Just prior to the Paris conference, 178 out of the
Framework Convention’s 196 country-parties had submitted an
INDC. These countries together emit 93% of the world’s
greenhouse gas emissions.31 The U.S. commitment noted in the
Introduction of this article was one of those.32 The Paris
Agreement is premised on a “bottom-up” approach to reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions, based on the sum total of all
INDCs and emissions reductions achieved under those
INDCs. Unfolding climate science developments underscore
the need for all countries, and particularly developed
countries like the United States, to significantly increase the
ambition of their commitments.
The Paris Agreement was designed to achieve the
objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
which is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”33 The
world’s understanding of what that level means is evolving in
the direction of lower concentrations of greenhouse gases and
thus lower emissions. Prior to Paris, the most frequently stated
goal was to hold the global increase in temperatures to 2°C (or
3.6°F) above preindustrial levels.34 The Paris Agreement,
however, aims to hold “the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and
31 Gregor Erbach, European Parliamentary Research Service, Negotiating a
New UN Climate Agreement: Challenges for the Paris Climate Change Conference, PE
Doc. 572.794, at 16 (2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/
572794/EPRS_IDA(2015)572794_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YTP-PVXA].
32 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
33 Framework Convention, supra note 1, at art. 2.
34 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10
December 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, ¶ 4, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011), http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/U62Y-C7S8].
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to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C
[2.7°F] above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”35
The 2°C limit has been translated into a specific carbon
“budget”—a numerical limit on all additional emissions,
cumulatively, for the rest of the century.36 The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that this budget
is between 630 and 1180 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent.37
That range represents the cumulative total of all new emissions of
carbon dioxide equivalent between 2011 and 2100.38 A budget, of
course, is finite; it cannot—or should not—be exceeded. In other
words, living within a budget necessarily requires that all
greenhouse gas emissions must sooner or later be net zero. To
have a “likely” chance of staying within a budget defined by a 2°C
increase, the IPCC says, global greenhouse gas emissions need to
be 40%–70% lower by 2050 and “near zero” gigatons of carbon
dioxide equivalent or “below” by 2100.39
It follows that net zero emissions must be achieved more
quickly to keep warming under 1.5°C. Table 1 shows the global
deadlines given by the United Nations Environment Program40
in 2015 for achieving net zero emissions in order to hold
temperatures below both 1.5°C and 2°C, respectively.

Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2.1(a).
Fred Pearce, What Is the Carbon Limit? That Depends Who You Ask, YALE
ENV’T 360 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/what_is_the_carbon_limit_that_
depends_who_you_ask/2825/ [https://perma.cc/T24V-9M89].
37 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 431 tbl.6.3 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014), https://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DW
7-7T82]. A gigaton is one billion tons. Carbon dioxide equivalent includes all greenhouses
gases measured according to the warming potential of carbon dioxide.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 10–12. The term “likely” means that the chance of a particular
outcome is greater than 66 percent, or two out of three. Id. at 4 n.2.
40 The United Nations Environment Programme provides extensive scientific,
technical, and policy analysis in support of global efforts to address climate change. See
generally Climate Change, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/climatechange/
[https://perma.cc/K7YL-AVBK].
35
36
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TABLE 1. Deadline for Achieving Net Zero Emissions with
Greater than a 50% Probability of Success41
1.5°C Increase

2°C Increase

Total carbon
dioxide emissions42

2045–2050

2065–2070

Total greenhouse
gas emissions
covered under
Kyoto Protocol43

2060–2080

2095

As Table 1 makes clear, the entire world must get to net
zero carbon dioxide emissions in roughly three decades in order
to hold the temperature increase below 1.5°C. Two extra
decades are allowed to get to net zero if the goal is to hold
temperatures below a 2°C increase. Under the 1.5°C scenario,
all other greenhouse gas emissions must be zero well before
century’s end, while the 2°C scenario permits the achievement
of zero greenhouse gas emissions shortly before 2100.
Three observations clarify both the daunting nature of
this challenge and its urgency. First, growth in energy use and,
consequently, carbon dioxide emissions, is projected to be very
high in the coming decades, particularly in developing
countries. Energy-related greenhouse gas emissions are
responsible for the great majority of total greenhouse gas
emissions.44 In addition, 78% of the total global greenhouse gas
emissions increase between 1970 and 2010 was due to carbon
dioxide emissions from energy and industrial production.45 As
recently as 2000, developed countries consumed more energy
overall than developing countries.46 By 2040, however,
developing country energy consumption is projected to be more
than double that in developed countries.47 More than 85% of the
41 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2015: A UNEP SYNTHESIS
REPORT 6, tbl.2.1 (2015), https://uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/theme/13/EGR_2015_
301115_lores.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7TS-WK8P] (advance report).
42 From energy and industry, as well as land use, land-use change, and forestry.
43 Not only carbon dioxide but also methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated
compounds.
44 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 37, at 354–55.
45 Id. at 6.
46 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, at 9
fig.12 (2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484(2013).pdf [https://perma.cc/V4A
B-YUX7].
47 Id.
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growth in energy consumption over that period will come from
developing countries.48 China and India alone are expected to
account for half of the global increase in energy consumption,49
and China’s energy consumption is projected to be more than
double that of the United States by 2040.50 While the focus of
this article is developed country jurisdictions, such as the United
States that could serve as models for developing countries’
decarbonization efforts, the growth of emissions from developing
countries underscores the need for the United States and other
developed countries to intensify their decarbonization efforts to
become such models.
Second, the probability of success given in Table 1 for
meeting either scenario is low for an event of this enormity.
That probability—only more than 50%—is just the smallest
fraction better than the odds in a coin flip, and the downside of
an adverse coin flip is serious. To have a higher probability of
success, net zero, or even negative emissions, would have to be
achieved even earlier. A variety of projections based on
business-as-usual emissions growth put the world on track for
a temperature increase of at least 3.7° to 4.8°C [6.7° to 8.6°F].51
A 2012 report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for
Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics describes the
impact of a 4°C temperature increase by 2100 as disastrous.52
Such a world, the report said, “would be one of unprecedented
heat waves, severe drought, and major floods in many regions,
with serious impacts on ecosystems and associated services,”
and no certainty that adaptation would even be possible.53
Climate change is also occurring with growing speed
and intensity. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
(including carbon dioxide) are higher now than they have been
in more than 800,000 years.54 Basic physics dictates that higher
atmospheric concentrations of these gases lead to warmer
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
50 Id. at 10.
51 SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L
RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION 4 (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/DDPP_Digit_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ9C-K3ZV].
52 THE WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMER WORLD
MUST BE AVOIDED, at xiii–xviii (2012), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/07/17/090224b0828c33e7/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Turn0
down0the00orld0must0be0avoided.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3ZF-H5G5].
53 Id. at xiii–xiv, xviii.
54 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 9 (2013), https://www.ipcc.
ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT
3D-79PX].
48
49
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temperatures and higher sea levels.55 We are already
experiencing the effects of climate change all over the world. The
year 2016 was the warmest year on record, eclipsing the previous
record set in 2015.56 According to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), “the first six months of 2016” was
the warmest six-month period in NASA’s “modern temperature
record, which dates to 1880.”57 All of this, of course, underscores
the importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions as rapidly
as possible.
Third, it may not be enough to bring the level of emissions
to zero. Carbon dioxide, the most prominent greenhouse gas,
stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years.58 Given the
magnitude of the risks involved, and the strong possibility—some
would say the certainty—that some nations will not significantly
reduce their emissions, it is likely that finding ways to remove
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and thus getting net
emissions below zero in other countries, will be necessary.59 That
will require significantly strengthening the INDCs.
A major problem known to the parties before Paris is that
their INDCs, taken together, are not sufficient to put countries
on a trajectory toward keeping the average temperature increase
below 2°C. The INDCs submitted by all countries prior to Paris
“present[ed] a real increase in the ambition level compared to a
projection of current policies,” according to the U.N.
Environment Program in 2015.60 As its report explains,
however, the INDCs represent only about half of the reduction
required by 2030 if the world is to have a likely chance (greater
than 66%) of keeping the global temperature increase below

55 For an explanation in “five easy steps” of how greenhouse gas emissions by
humans are causing climate change, see MICHAEL E. MANN, THE HOCKEY STICK AND
THE CLIMATE WARS: DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES 12–18 (2012).
56 NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally, NASA
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-data-show-2016-warmestyear-on-record-globally [https://perma.cc/7WT6-82JH].
57 2016 Climate Trends Continue to Break Records, NASA (July 19, 2016), http://
www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/climate-trends-continue-to-break-records [https://perm
a.cc/8ATD-DRSY].
58 See Carbon Is Forever, NATURE REPORTS CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 20, 2008),
http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0812/full/climate.2008.122.html [https://perma.cc/U
NX6-AUJD].
59 Bobby Magill, Michigan Scientists See Urgency for Negative Emissions,
CLIMATE CENT. (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/scientists-seeurgency-for-negative-emissions-20588 [https://perma.cc/UY9B-EZWN]. Still, there appear
to be serious economic and technological limits to employing various carbon removal
methods at scale. See Pete Smith et al., Biophysical and Economic Limits to Negative CO2
Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 42 (2015).
60 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 41, at xviii.
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2°C.61 Similarly, both the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the International Energy
Agency issued reports prior to the conference saying that the
total emissions reductions from all countries that had thus far
submitted would barely change the world’s greenhouse gas
emissions trajectory.62 The Conference of the Parties in Paris
noted this emissions gap—between what is needed and what
was promised—“with concern.”63
To meet the zero-emissions goal, the Paris Agreement
established a process for ratcheting up national emissions
reductions commitments over time. Beginning in 2020, and every
five years afterwards, each country is to “prepare, communicate
and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that
it intends to achieve.”64 These, of course, are in addition to those
that countries have already submitted. Each “successive nationally
determined contribution” is to “represent a progression beyond the
Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect
its highest possible ambition.”65 Beginning in 2023, and every five
years afterward, the Conference of the Parties is to “take stock of
the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective
progress towards achieving [its] purpose.”66 “The outcome of th[is]
global stocktake” is to “inform Parties in updating and enhancing,
in a nationally determined manner, their actions,” including
“enhanc[ed] international cooperation for climate action.”67 The
Paris Agreement also stated that “[a]ll Parties should strive to
formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas
61 UNEP’s Emissions Gas Report: INDCs Signal Unprecedented Momentum
for Climate Agreement in Pairs, but Achieving 2 Degree Objective Contingent upon
Enhanced Ambition in Future Years, U.N. ENV’T (Nov. 6, 2015), http://web.unep.org/
africa/news/unep’s-emissions-gap-report-indcs-signal-unprecedented-momentum-climateagreement-paris [https://perma.cc/3LKW-ERC3]; see U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note
41, at xviii.
62 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION:
POLICIES AND PROGRESS 16 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/97
15061e.pdf?expires=1483564380&id=id&accname=ocid45121179&checksum=8D057A0
0C441F52D9CE97FC5C6C2A7F9 [https://perma.cc/UJF4-BHQ5] (“Even if the INDCs
and national targets announced to date are fully achieved, the remaining global carbon
budget (consistent with a below 2 °C world) will be exhausted by around 2040 unless
stronger action is taken.”); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT 12 (2015), https://www.iea.org/publications/
freepublications/publication/WEO2015SpecialReportonEnergyandClimateChange.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47AH-7T4S] (“With INDCs submitted so far, and the planned energy
policies in countries that have yet to submit, the world’s estimated remaining carbon budget
consistent with a 50% chance of keeping the rise in temperature below 2 °C is consumed by
around 2040—eight months later than is projected in the absence of INDCs.”).
63 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, para. 17.
64 Id. arts. 4.2, 4.9; see also Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 3, paras. 23, 24.
65 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.3.
66 Id. arts. 14.1, 14.2.
67 Id. art. 14.3.
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emission development strategies.”68 The parties to the
agreement were also invited “to communicate, by 2020, to the
secretariat mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission
development strategies” that would then be published on the
secretariat’s website.69 Again, the overall objective is net zero
greenhouse gas emissions by the second half of the century.70
Another significant challenge for the United States is
the expectation stated in the Framework Convention that
developed countries will take a leadership position in reducing
their greenhouse gas emissions. As the preamble states,
developed countries have contributed “the largest share of
historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases.”71
They also, by definition, have greater financial and technological
resources. Thus, in ratifying the Framework Convention,
developed countries agreed to adopt policies and measures that
will demonstrate that they are “taking the lead” in addressing
climate change.72 That means that the United States, among
other developed countries, should strive to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions as rapidly as possible. In other words, the
emissions reductions curves for developed countries should be
steeper than those for developing countries. Such a leadership
position, for example, would require that the United States
reduce the carbon dioxide emissions intensity of the economy
(carbon dioxide emissions per dollar of GDP) by an annual rate
of 8% between now and 2050.73 By contrast, the currently
projected total reduction in carbon dioxide emissions intensity
between 2016 and 2040 is 10%.74 A steeper glide path to
decarbonization requires the United States to learn from
jurisdictions that are further along.
B.

Deep Decarbonization’s Technical and Policy Pathways

A basic problem with long-term emissions reduction
goals is that “there has been little physically realistic modeling
of the energy and economic transformations required” to
Id. art. 4.19.
Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 3, para. 36.
70 Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.1.
71 Framework Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
72 Id. art. 4.2(a).
73 2 JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT,
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2015),
http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_
Policy_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2SZ-4E9E] [hereinafter DDPP U.S. POLICY REPORT].
74 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 24 (2017), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9M5-ZLLT].
68
69
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substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions by that date.75
Using California’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
by 90% from 1990 levels by 2050 as a focal point, Jim Williams
and others concluded in a 2012 paper that technically feasible
energy efficiency and renewable electricity by themselves are
not sufficient to achieve California’s goals.76 It is also necessary,
they concluded, that the transportation sector moves from liquid
fossil fuels to decarbonized electricity.77 This analysis, which
shows the value of sophisticated long-term thinking and
modeling on the necessary long-term changes, marks the
beginning of the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project
(DDPP).78 The modeling and analysis exemplified by the DDPP
provide a way of envisioning the major technological and other
changes that are needed, the basic policy options that exist,
and the decisions that must be made.
The DDPP, which is led by the Sustainable Development
Solutions Network79 and the Institute for Sustainable Development
and International Relations,80 is the principal international effort
to devise pathways to decarbonize the global economy.81 Other
reports look at decarbonization solely from a global perspective,82
and individual nations have produced their own reports on
pathways to decarbonization,83 but the DDPP appears to be the

75 James H. Williams et al., The Technology Path to Deep Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Cuts by 2050: The Pivotal Role of Electricity, 335 SCIENCE 53, 53 (2012). Jim
Williams now directs the DDPP project. About, DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS
PROJECT, http://deepdecarbonization.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/7ZDG-2XCP].
76 Williams et al., supra note 75, at 53.
77 Id. at 53–54.
78 See Jim Williams et al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United
States slide 5 (May 10, 2016) (PowerPoint presentation) (on file with author).
79 Vision and Organization, SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK, http://unsdsn.
org/about-us/vision-and-organization/ [https://perma.cc/C3TF-53D5]; see also About, supra
note 75 (explaining relationship between Sustainable Development Solutions Network
and Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project).
80 Id.; see also IDDRI, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, http://
www.iddri.org/Iddri/ [https://perma.cc/3YFX-2DAG].
81 See SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L
RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION 4 (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/09/DDPP_Digit_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLE2-5WVG] [hereinafter
DDPP 2014 REPORT].
82 MARIANNE FAY ET AL., INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV./THE WORLD
BANK, DECARBONIZING DEVELOPMENT: THREE STEPS TO A ZERO-CARBON FUTURE (2015),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21842 (following “English PDF Final”
hyperlink).
83 See, e.g., U.K., HM GOVERNMENT, 2050 PATHWAYS ANALYSIS (2010), https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/42562/216-2050pathways-analysis-report.pdf [hereinafter UK PATHWAYS ANALYSIS]. The European Union
has also published several deep decarbonization roadmaps. Claire Dupont & Sebastian
Oberthür, Decarbonization in the EU: Setting the Scene, in DECARBONIZATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: INTERNAL POLICIES AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIES, supra note 26, at 1, 7–8.
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only effort to systematically and comprehensively analyze
decarbonization pathways across the globe.
DDPP is based on the work of research teams in 16
countries that are responsible for 74% of the world’s greenhouse
gas emissions: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South
Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.84 The project was undertaken “to understand and show
how individual countries can transition to a low-carbon economy”
based on the limit of 2°C.85 Prior to this project, most of these
countries “had never developed pathways consistent with a global
2°C limit, nor were they actively considering this question.”86
The overall objective of the project is to devise pathways
that will “ensure a better-than-even chance of remaining below
a 2°C temperature rise,” based on the 2014 report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).87 To
ensure that result, the IPCC said, requires that global emissions
must be reduced 42%–57% below 2010 levels by 2050, and 73%–
107% below 2010 levels by 2100.88 To have a greater possibility
of success of keeping the temperature increase below 2°C, or to
have any reasonable possibility of keeping the temperature
increase below 1.5°C, would require even greater and more
rapid reductions.89 (Table 1 indicates the need for more rapid
reductions for both temperature scenarios.) Effectively addressing
climate change, DDPP says, will require, “more than any other
factor, the profound transformation of energy systems through
steeply reducing carbon intensity in all sectors of the economy.”90
The project also assumes a century-long effort divided into two
parts, 2011–2050 and 2051–2100; most of the emissions reduction
would occur prior to 2050, with the rest occurring afterward as
emissions reach zero.91
DDPP concludes that it is technically feasible to limit
warming to 2°C despite global growth in population of 17%
between 2010 and 2050 and global GDP growth of 250% in the
84 SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L
RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION: 2015 REPORT 3 (2015), http://deep
decarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/DDPP_2015_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.
cc/H58P-29FB] [hereinafter DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT].
85 DDPP 2014 REPORT, supra note 81, at III.
86 DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 42.
87 Id. at 3.
88 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 37, at 13,
tbl.SPM.1.
89 Id.
90 DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 3. Some of the individual
country reports, however, address other greenhouse gases. Id. at 18 n.10.
91 DDPP 2014 REPORT, supra note 81, at 8.
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same period.92 Research teams in each of the sixteen countries
used a “backcasting” approach that assumed the 2°C goal based
on the IPCC carbon budget had been met and then described
the changes that were needed to achieve that goal.93 The
research teams, which worked independently of their
governments, were comprised primarily of technology, energy,
and economic analysts.94 The most ambitious pathways in these
reports reduced emissions intensity per unit of GDP by 87%
from 2010 levels by 2050 and emissions intensity per capita by
62%.95 Nearly all of the reports showed pathways to reducing
carbon dioxide emissions to 2 tons or less per capita by 2050,96
which is much lower than the current global average of 5.2 tons
per capita.97 Because per capita emissions tend to be higher in
developed countries than in developing countries, the needed
emissions reductions in developed countries are greater.
All pathways are based on “three pillars of energy
system transformation.”98 These are (1) energy efficiency and
conservation across all sectors of the economy, including power
generation, transportation, buildings, industry, and urban design;
(2) low-carbon electricity from replacement of fossil fuel-based
generation with renewable energy or the use of carbon capture
and storage at fossil fuel based generating facilities; and (3)
switching from more carbon intensive fuels to less carbonintensive fuels in all economic sectors.99 Deep decarbonization
requires that all three be achieved at scale in all countries.100
The first pillar, energy efficiency and conservation, plays the
dominant role in the DDPP scenarios prior to 2030, while the

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at X. Nearly all of the reports for the sixteen countries are available at
Country Reports, DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, http://deepdecarbonization.
org/countries/ [https://perma.cc/HXR6-YRS9]. For an explanation of the use of backcasting
in achieving sustainability, see Philip J. Vergragt & Jaco Quist, Backcasting for
Sustainability: Introduction to the Special Issue, 78 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING &
SOC. CHANGE 747 (2011).
94 The U.S. research team, for example, drew from a consulting firm and two
U.S. government laboratories, 1 JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON.
(E3), LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB. & PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at iii (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Technical_Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W7FU-FUU2] [hereinafter DDPP U.S. TECHNICAL REPORT].
95 DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 6.
96 Id. at 6–7. The two exceptions are China and South Africa, which are
reduced to about three tons per capita by 2050. Id. at 7, tbl.4a.
97 DDPP 2014 REPORT, supra note 81, at VIII, 24–26.
98 DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 8.
99 Id.
100 Id.
92
93
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second and third pillars become the primary drivers of
decarbonization after that.101
The tipping point to decarbonization occurs, according to
DDPP, when “costs decline at a rate and speed sufficient to drive
their global deployment based solely on their favorable
economics.”102 Getting to that point requires enormous new
investment in low-carbon technologies, though gross energy
investment will be only modestly greater than it is at present.103
That level of new and redirected investment requires “that
policymakers establish investment market rules and institutions
to direct investments towards low-carbon options.”104 One
approach is for developed countries to “take the lead in
developing, deploying, and buying down the cost of low-carbon
technologies so they become affordable earlier in developing
countries, relative to the cost of conventional technologies.”105
According to DDPP, these pathways have enormous
practical value for all stakeholders: “By describing the full extent
of the transformation required over a longer time frame, DDPs
provide a unique context for understanding the ambition of
current INDCs, and what further measures deep decarbonization
will entail.”106 These pathways allow decision makers to see how
the next thing that ostensibly needs to be done, or how the
climate-related issue now in front of them, fits into an overall
effort to decarbonize a nation’s entire economy. This is
particularly true because, as noted earlier, most of the sixteen
DDPP countries had not previously engaged in this effort.107 And
it is true, not only of governmental decision makers but also of
private decision makers and their investors.108
C.

Identifying Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization

While the DDPP illuminates key technical and policy
approaches required for deep decarbonization, it does not identify
in any detail the legal options or pathways that are required.

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 30.
103 Id. at 32.
104 Id. at 34.
105 Id. at 30; see Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable
Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681 (2012) (recommending ways to design and implement policies to
make renewable energy more appealing to investors and facilitate faster deployment of
renewable energy at a lower cost).
106 DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 35.
107 Id. at 42.
108 Id. at 36.
101
102
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While the DDPP has prepared reports for the United States,109
for instance, those reports do not explain what laws the United
States would need to adopt to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050.
Ultimately, deep decarbonization is not likely to occur
unless specific policies are translated into draft laws, enacted,
and then implemented. The identification and analysis of
different laws or combinations of laws would make it possible
for decision makers and the public to visualize what the legal
choices are, enabling lawyers, policymakers, and the public to
understand specifically how decarbonization could work. It
would help close the gap between the emissions reduction goal
and the specific legal actions that are needed to achieve it.
Such an analysis would also provide a legal playbook or toolbox
for policymakers, lawyers, and others.
Many possible legal and policy approaches to
decarbonization are available, including government-supported
research and development, carbon pricing, regulation, public
information, and land use and transportation law changes. For
any given policy option—say carbon pricing—a variety of
approaches exist, including not only cap-and-trade and carbon
taxation, but also a wide variety of designs for any law that
would impose a carbon price.110 Legal tools can be used
independently or in combination, and they can be sequenced in
different ways over time. An analysis of different legal pathways
could illuminate tradeoffs among and between different
approaches and identify ways in which various tools could be
mutually reinforcing or mutually antagonistic. What laws are
needed in individual sectors, such as industry, agriculture,
forestry, and electricity generation—to produce negative
emissions? What are the most cost-effective and equitable ways
of drafting and implementing those laws, and with the most
benefits? What legal obstacles exist, and what are the best ways
of overcoming them? The development of different legal
pathways—based on different tools and combinations of tools—
could assist in answering those questions.
As anyone who has drafted a statute or regulation well
knows, there is often a considerable initial difference between
the policy preference of the client (be it a government agency,
legislator, business, or nongovernmental organization) and what
109 See DDPP U.S. POLICY REPORT, supra note 73; DDPP U.S. TECHNICAL
REPORT, supra note 94.
110 See, e.g., SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR
HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011).
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is needed to translate that policy into an appropriate law. Only
very rarely can a policy proposal be translated directly into a
statute or regulation without the addition of considerable detail
(e.g., definition of terms, and in particular who or what is
covered; timing; what statute(s), if any, need to be amended or
repealed; procedural requirements like permitting and public
notice, etc.). The more legally precise a particular proposal is,
the easier it is to translate that proposal into draft legislation.
Legal pathways or options, as described here, still need to be
translated into draft legislation or regulatory language. But they
provide a much higher level of detail about what the relevant
laws would require or prohibit, and they provide policy makers,
lawyers, the public, and others with a clearer immediate
understanding of what the ultimately enacted law would do.
And a law that has been adopted and applied somewhere else,
with many of the relevant details already resolved, is vastly
easier to adapt to one’s jurisdiction than starting from scratch.
There is, at present, no comprehensive analysis of legal
pathways to deep decarbonization in the United States.111
Another source of information about possible legal pathways
exists in the jurisdictions that have already made significant
progress toward deep decarbonization, including California and
Germany. While these jurisdictions have not achieved deep
decarbonization, they are significantly farther along than the
United States, and there is much the country can learn from
their legal experiences.
II.

OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY IN
CALIFORNIA, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES

While California, Germany, and the United States are all
addressing climate change, California and Germany have set
longer-term and more specific goals for reducing emissions and
have adopted more ambitious laws, in comparison to the United
States. They have also achieved greater percentage reductions in
emissions than the United States. The first part of this section
describes and analyzes emissions as well as targets and
timetables in each jurisdiction. The second part describes what
each jurisdiction has done so far to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions and also describes analytical work done by others,
particularly the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, to
111 Such an analysis should be available in 2018. LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach
eds., forthcoming 2018).
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explain how decarbonization can be achieved. Both Germany
and California have a long way to go in achieving decarbonization,
but the United States lags considerably behind them.
A.

Emissions, Targets, and Timetables

Not surprisingly, the United States emits far more
greenhouse gas emissions in millions of metric tons of carbon
dioxide equivalent than either California or Germany, as Table 2
shows. It also had the greatest increase (7.3%) in overall
greenhouse gas emissions between 1990 and 2014. California’s
increase was much smaller (2.7%), while Germany had a
remarkable 27.6% reduction.
TABLE 2. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in California, Germany,
and the United States in Million Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide
Equivalent (Excluding Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry)

1990

2014

California

431112

441.5113

Percentage
Difference
2.4

Germany114

1248

902

(27.6)

6397.1

6870.5

7.4

United
States115

California and Germany have set short-term as well as
long-term economy-wide goals for reducing their emissions by
80% from 1990 levels by 2050. As already explained, their longterm goals can be criticized as insufficiently ambitious in light
112 California 1990 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Level and 2020 Limit, CAL. AIR
RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/1990level/1990level.htm [https://perma.cc/8
YSL-5EYU] (1990 figure as revised in 2014).
113 California Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory—2016 Edition, CAL. AIR RES.
BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/data.htm [https://perma.cc/W4N6-QVJM].
114 FED. ENV’T AGENCY (GERMANY), SUBMISSION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 2016:
NATIONAL INVENTORY REPORT FOR THE GERMAN GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY 1990–
2014, at 70 (2016), https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/378/
publikationen/climate_change_24_2016_submission_under_the_united_nations_frame
work_nir_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SNB-535B]; SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK &
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION
IN GERMANY 3 (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DDPP_
DEU.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BEB-KF2X] [hereinafter PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION
IN GERMANY].
115 EPA, supra note 8, at ES-24 tbl.ES-7.
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of the developing science. Still, they are considerably more
ambitious and longer term than that of the United States,
which has only a short-term reduction goal. Table 3 provides a
summary of these goals.
TABLE 3. Economy-Wide Greenhouse Gas Targets and
Timetables: California, Germany, and United States

California

Germany

United States

Short-Term or
Intermediate Emissions
Reduction Goals(s)

Long-Term
Emissions Reduction
Goal(s)

Reduce emissions to 1990
levels by 2020116

Reduce emissions to
80% below 1990
levels by 2050118

Reduce emissions to 40%
below 1990 levels by
2030117
Reduce emissions to 40%
below 1990 levels by
2020119

Reduce emissions to
70% below 1990
levels by 2040121

Reduce emissions to at
least 55% below 1990
levels by 2030120

Reduce emissions to
80%–95% below
1990 levels by
2050122
None

Reduce emissions to
26%–28% below 2005
levels by 2025123

116 Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (Cal. 2005), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=
1861 [https://perma.cc/G5WA-6HZ4]. This goal for 2020 is reaffirmed in Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38505(n), 38551 (West 2010).
117 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2016); Cal. Exec. Order No. B30-15 (2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18938 [https://perma.cc/Q8TG-HE77].
118 Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (Cal. 2005).
119 European Commission, Submission by Latvia and the European Commission
on Behalf of the European Union and Its Member States 1 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www4.
unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Latvia/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9498-F2DU].
120 GERMAN FED. MINISTRY OF ECON. & TECH. & GERMAN FED. MINISTRY FOR
THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION & NUCLEAR SAFETY, ENERGY CONCEPT FOR AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND, RELIABLE AND AFFORDABLE ENERGY SUPPLY 5 (2010), http://
www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/energy-concept,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=e
n,rwb=true.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6UM-7A8F].
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 UNITED STATES, COVER NOTE INDC, supra note 11.
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The short-term or intermediate targets and timetables
set by the United States, as Table 3 indicates, are much less
ambitious than the short-term or intermediate goals established
by California and Germany. The United States’ choice of a 2005
baseline affects the ambitiousness of its goals. Because U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 were 16.6% greater than those
in 1990,124 the U.S. short-term or intermediate objective
translates roughly to a reduction of 14%–16% below 1990 levels.
This is significantly lower than Germany’s objective for
achieving a 40% reduction below 1990 levels by 2020, and
appears to be slightly lower than that in California, which plans
to go from 1990 levels in 2020 to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030.
If California achieves that reduction in equal annual
percentages over that decade, its emissions would be 20% below
1990 levels by 2025.
While the United States did not commit to a long-term
emissions reduction goal, its INDC stated: “This target is
consistent with a straight line emission reduction pathway from
2020 to deep, economy-wide emission reductions of 80% or more
by 2050.”125 Even if the United States had stated this endpoint
as a goal, it would still be less ambitious than the goals set in
California and Germany because it employs a 2005 baseline.
In addition to the overall targets and timetables stated
in Table 3, California and Germany have sector-specific targets
and timetables as well as targets for renewable energy and
energy efficiency. In California, these include having renewable
sources provide 33% of the state’s electricity by 2020126 and 50%
of the state’s electricity by 2030,127 reducing petroleum use by
half by 2030,128 and doubling “the planned level of savings from
energy efficiency improvements in existing buildings.”129

124 U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 were 7350.2 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent, compared to 6301.1 tons in 1990. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2013, at ES-17 tbl.ES-4 (2015), http://
www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2015-MainText.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M4X-QEQQ]. The 2005 baseline, in other words, is 16.6%
higher than the 1990 baseline. Thus, emissions reductions from the 2005 baseline are not
as great as those from the 1990 baseline.
125 UNITED STATES, COVER NOTE INDC, supra note 11.
126 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 (West 2011).
127 Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015, S.B. 350, 2015–16 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
128 CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA’S 2030 CLIMATE COMMITMENTS:
CUTTING PETROLEUM USE IN HALF BY 2030, http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/petroleum_
reductions.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS4Z-SS9Z].
129 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S 2030 CLIMATE COMMITMENT: DOUBLE
ENERGY SAVINGS IN EXISTING BUILDINGS & DEVELOP CLEANER HEATING FUELS BY
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Germany’s specific targets and timetables are intertwined
with those of the European Union (EU), but in some ways are
more ambitious. The EU aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
by 20% by 2020, 40% by 2030, and 80%–95% below 1990 levels by
2050.130 As part of the EU’s overall effort to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, it has adopted both energy efficiency and renewable
energy goals. Germany, in turn, has adopted specific goals for
both energy efficiency and renewable energy.
For energy efficiency, the European Council has set a goal
for 2020 of “saving 20% of the EU’s energy consumption compared
to projections,”131 and a goal for 2030 of achieving a 27%
improvement in energy efficiency “compared to projections of
future energy consumption.”132 The European Parliament and
Council have adopted directives133 to implement the 2007 European
Council’s goals for energy efficiency.134 The energy efficiency
directive requires each of the EU’s twenty-eight member states to
establish “an indicative national energy efficiency target” for 2020,
and to express that target in terms of overall primary and final
energy consumption in that year.135 In 2013, Germany submitted
2030, http://www.energy.ca.gov/commission/fact_sheets/documents/Fact_Sheet_-_Energy_
Efficiency.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6U4-BS86].
130 EU Climate Action, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/citizens/eu/
index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/QW92-YX4G]. Consistent with that, the EU INDC states:
“The EU and its Member States [including Germany] are committed to a binding target
of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to
1990.” European Commission, supra note 119, at 1.
131 Council of the European Union, Cover Note from Presidency to Delegations,
Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007: Presidency Conclusions, Council of the
European Union (2007) annex 1, paras. 6, 7 (May 2, 2007), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYK7-8H99].
132 European Council, Cover Note from General Secretariat of the Council to
Delegations, European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) Conclusions, EUCO 169/14,
CO EUR 13, CONCL 5, para. 3 (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LDS-SGZT].
133 In EU parlance, a directive requires each Member State to adopt legislation in
order to achieve formulated goals, but leaves discretion to the Member State as to how to
achieve the goal. What Is an EU Directive?, EUROPEAN LAW MONITOR, http://www.european
lawmonitor.org/what-is-guide-to-key-eu-terms/eu-legislation-what-is-an-eu-directive.html
[https://perma.cc/UZ9J-X5DW].
134 Council Directive 2012/27, 2012 O.J. (L. 315) 1 (EC), https://biobs.jrc.ec.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/generated/files/policy/Directive%202012-27-EU%20Energy%
20Efficiency.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGS5-BDC3] [hereinafter EU Energy Efficiency
Directive].
135 Id. art. 3(1). The directive translates the 20% goal for 2020 into two figures—
1474 million tons of oil equivalent of “primary energy consumption,” and 1078 million
tons of oil equivalent of “final energy consumption.” Id. arts. 2(2), 2(3), 3(1)(a). Final
energy consumption is a lower figure because of, among other things, energy losses at the
power plant in translating primary energy into electricity, and energy losses that occur in
transmission of electricity in power lines. In addition, it required each Member State to
submit, by 2014, a National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, which was to include
“‘significant energy efficiency improvement measures and expected and/or achieved
energy savings . . . in view of achieving the national energy efficiency targets.” Id. art.
24(2). This submission is to be repeated “every three years thereafter.” Id. The plan also
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its indicative national energy efficiency target, stating that it
intended to “reduc[e] primary energy consumption by 20 % by
2020 and 50 % by 2050 compared to 2008.”136
For renewable energy, the European Council has set a
goal for 2020 of increasing to 20% the “share of renewable
energies in overall EU energy consumption,” and a goal for 2030
of increasing to 27% the share of renewable energy consumed in
the European Union.137 The European Council also has adopted
a directive to implement the renewable energy goals.138 The
renewable energy directive requires each member state to
“ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources . . . in
gross final consumption of energy in 2020” meets a specified
percentage.139 Germany’s required share is 18%.140 The directive
also requires each member state to “adopt a national renewable
energy action plan” that includes, among other things, “national
targets for the share of energy from renewable sources
consumed in transport, electricity and heating and cooling in
2020.”141 In its national renewable energy action plan, the
country says that it expects to slightly exceed the 2020 target by
achieving 19.6% renewable energy.142
Germany has also established, independently of the EU,
goals to increase the proportion of electricity consumption from
renewable sources to 80% by 2050, with intermediate goals of
50% by 2030, and 65% by 2040.143 In addition, after the
is to include a “strategy for mobilizing investment” in the energy efficient upgrade and
retrofit of existing commercial and residential building stock, id. art. 4, promote the
market for energy services, id. art. 18, and identify measures that will be employed to
remove “barriers to energy efficiency.” Id. art. 19.
136 GERMAN FED. OFFICE OF ECON. & EXP. CONTROL, FED. AGENCY FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY, 3RD NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN (NEEAP) 2014 FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 5 (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/
documents/2014_neeap_en_germany.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA2C-U333] [hereinafter 3RD
NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN].
137 Council of the European Union, supra note 131, at annex. I, paras. 6, 7;
European Council, supra note 132.
138 Council Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L. 140) 16, http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0028&from=EN [https://perma.cc/5
PH6-M6ET] [hereinafter EU Renewable Energy Directive].
139 Id. art. 3.1. This directive applies to both electricity and liquid fuels such
as gasoline.
140 Id. at annex I(A).
141 Id. art. 4.1.
142 FED. REPUBLIC OF GER., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN IN
ACCORDANCE WITH DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC ON THE PROMOTION OF THE USE OF ENERGY FROM
RENEWABLE SOURCES 5 (2010), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/
national-action-plans (follow “Germany” hyperlink). “The share of renewable energies in the
electricity sector will thereby amount to 38.6 %, the share in the heating/cooling sector will
be 15.5 %, while in the transport sector it will amount to 13.2 %.” Id.
143 GERMAN FED. MINISTRY OF ECON. & TECH. & GERMAN FED. MINISTRY FOR THE
ENV’T, supra note 120, at 5. For an argument that Germany’s 2050 goal for renewable
electricity should be 100%, see GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENV’T, PATHWAYS
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Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011,144 Germany set a goal for
nuclear power of a different kind: zero nuclear energy by 2022.145
Of the seventeen nuclear power plants then in operation, which
provided about 25% of the country’s electricity production, nine
were already closed as of 2016. The remaining eight, which
provide about 16% of the country’s electricity, are to be closed by
that date.146
The United States has also begun establishing more
specific goals, but not through law. In 2015, President Obama
announced two goals: (1) that 20% of the electricity generated
in 2030 will come from renewable sources, and (2) that energy
productivity will double by 2030.147 In June 2016, the
presidents of Mexico, Canada, and the United States agreed
that 50% of North Americans’ electricity in 2025 would come
from “clean energy” sources, a term that includes hydroelectric
and nuclear energy.148 This is higher than the present figure of
about 35% and the Energy Information Administration’s
previously projected figure of 43% for 2025.149 The increased
ambition of these recently stated goals moves the United States
closer to those of Germany and California. As this article goes
to press, the continued existence of these goals is in doubt.
TOWARDS A 100 % RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM (2011). Many cities and regions in
Germany are already working toward a 100% renewable electricity goal. Anna Milena
Jurca, Note, The Energiewende: Germany’s Transition to an Economy Fueled by
Renewables, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 172–76 (2014).
144 Mayumi Negishi & Eric Pfanner, Fukushima Still Rattles Japan, Five Years
After Nuclear Disaster, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fuku
shima-still-rattles-japan-five-years-after-nuclear-disaster-1457482830 [https://perma.cc/R
2HK-9KK5].
145 Uranium and Nuclear Energy, FED. MINISTRY FOR ECON. AFFAIRS & ENERGY,
http://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Textsammlungen/Energy/kernenergie.html;jsession
id=DD1062E21FA0EED341E9781373D38141 [https://perma.cc/7KAP-RQJK].
146 Id.; German Cabinet Approves 2022 Nuclear Shutdown, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(June 7, 2011), http://www.dw.com/en/german-cabinet-approves-2022-nuclear-shutdown/
a-15134028 [https://perma.cc/73LNSLLS]; Nuclear Power in Germany, WORLD NUCLEAR
ASS’N,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/
germany.aspx [https://perma.cc/WJ9Q-PG27] (last updated Feb. 8, 2017).
147 Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: President Obama Announces
New Actions to Bring Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency to Households Across the
Country (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/24/factsheet-president-obama-announces-new-actions-bring-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/
GM5G-8C9Z]. Energy productivity measures how much energy is needed to produce a
dollar of GDP, and is a measure of energy efficiency. GLOB. ALL. FOR ENERGY
PRODUCTIVITY, ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY PLAYBOOK 3 (2016), https://www.ase.org/sites/ase.
org/files/gaep_playbook-energy-productivity_alliance-to-save-energy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C8H7-RVSH].
148 Jason Furman & Brian Deese, The Economic Benefits of a 50 Percent
Target for Clean Energy Generation by 2025, WHITE HOUSE (June 29, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/06/29/economic-benefits-50-percent-target-cleanenergy-generation-2025 [https://perma.cc/THB5-MJV2].
149 Id.
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B.

Legal and Policy Actions Toward Decarbonization

California and Germany have adopted more ambitious
laws and have done much greater analytical work and public
outreach in determining how to achieve deep decarbonization
than the United States, even though both have a long way to go.
While U.S. efforts have become more ambitious in recent years,
California and Germany are much farther along. In all three,
there is also at least one long-term deep decarbonization strategy.
1. California
a. Actions
California’s greenhouse gas mitigation effort is based on
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and direct regulation of
greenhouse gases. The oldest of these efforts are directed at
energy efficiency and predate the 1992 Framework Convention
on Climate Change.
For four decades, “California has implemented costeffective building codes and appliance standards that have saved
consumers billions of dollars.”150 California has long been a
leader in implementing statewide efficiency standards for
appliances, such as refrigerators, influencing other states and
national product suppliers to improve codes and performance.151
California’s standards, in fact, prompted the federal government
to adopt energy efficiency standards for a wide range of
household appliances as well as industrial equipment, such as
pumps.152 California has exercised similar leadership in building
codes.153 It has also adopted strategic plans for net zero energy in
residential and commercial buildings.154 Other energy efficiency
measures include financial incentives; required disclosure of
nonresidential building energy use to buyers, lenders, and
lessees; energy savings requirements for public buildings and
government vehicle fleets; energy savings performance contract
150 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, TRACKING PROGRESS 1 (2015), http://www.energy.
ca.gov/renewables/tracking_progress/documents/energy_efficiency.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A3J3-DVBU].
151 See Ann E. Carlson, Commentary, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63, 65 (2008).
152 ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ENERGY EFFICIENCY
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF TRENDS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT 12–13 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46532.pdf [https://perma.cc/U
6YW-RRSX].
153 Id. at 7–11.
154 Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.
cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=4125 [https://perma.cc/26V9-E5C2].
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authorization for state agencies; and research and development.155
California has also decoupled utility profits from sales of
electricity, imposed a charge of 0.3 cents per kilowatt-hour to fund
energy efficiency and other public benefit activities, and
established energy efficiency goals along with incentives for
utilities to achieve those goals.156
These and other measures have meant that, for about
four decades, per capita electricity consumption in California
has been relatively flat, even as per capita U.S. consumption has
increased by about 50%. California has thus saved consumers
billions of dollars, reduced air pollution from fossil fuels, created
jobs, and helped low-income families.157
California also has an aggressive program for renewable
energy. The centerpiece of the program is the state’s renewable
portfolio standard, which requires that the percentage of the
state’s retail electricity sales that come from renewable sources
increase each year. That percentage is required to reach 33%
by 2020158 and 50% by 2030.159 Other legal tools to support this
effort include a feed-in tariff for smaller renewable electricity
generators.160 In addition, the state has a net-metering law that
allows electricity customers who generate their own renewable
energy to sell their extra electricity back to the grid.161
California also has the nation’s most far-reaching climate
change legislation. California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006 (known as AB 32, after its bill number in the legislature)
requires the state to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels by 2020.162 AB 32 assigns to the California Air
155 California, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., http://data
base.aceee.org/state/california [https://perma.cc/9DLW-G63A] (last updated Sept. 2016).
156 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAL PROSPECTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 282–83 (2010). But see Arik Levinson, California Energy Efficiency:
Lessons for the Rest of the World, or Not?, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 269 (2014)
(arguing that the most important reasons for flattened electricity consumption are related
to California’s relatively mild climate and its demographics).
157 NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, FACT SHEET: CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY EFFICIENCY
SUCCESS STORY: SAVING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND CURBING TONS OF POLLUTION 2
(2013), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/ca-success-story-FS.pdf [https://perma.cc/M
XG5-JTRT].
158 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 (West 2011).
159 Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015, S.B. 350, 2015–2016
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
160 Mormann et al., supra note 28, at 79–80. A feed-in tariff guarantees
renewable energy developers a price for the electricity they provide, ordinarily for a
period of fifteen to twenty years, and guarantees access to the grid. State and Local
Governments, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/
state_local_governments/basics_tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/4H6J-483F].
161 See Mormann et al., supra note 28, at 79–80.
162 California, Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 38500–99 (West 2007).
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Resources Board (CARB) the task of choosing legal and policy
tools to meet that goal.163 CARB has elected to proceed with an
economy-wide cap-and-trade program.164 The program caps
overall greenhouse gas emissions and then reduces the overall
emissions limit annually until the 2020 goal is met. Sources
covered under the cap—which emit 85% of California’s
greenhouse gas emissions—are each subject to their own
declining emissions caps.165 In 2014, California linked its cap-andtrade program to Quebec’s cap-and-trade program, creating a
larger emissions trading market,166 which expands economic
opportunities for trading and should reduce costs. In 2016,
California adopted legislation setting a goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by 40% from 1990 levels by 2030.167
While the legislation does not specifically address cap-and-trade,
it does require the adoption of regulations for “cost-effective
greenhouse gas emissions reductions.”168 Because emissions
trading is considered more cost-effective than many other
approaches, there is a significant likelihood that the state will
modify its existing emissions trading program to meet the more
ambitious 2030 goal.
The cap-and-trade program is only part of California’s
comprehensive plan for achieving the “maximum technologically
feasible” and “cost-effective” reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions that AB 32 mandates.169 California has adopted lowcarbon fuel standards, which would cut greenhouse gas
emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of transportation
fuels used in the state by at least 10% by 2020.170 California also
limits the carbon intensity of new long-term electricity supply
Id. § 38501(f)–(h).
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801–96022 (2017).
165 Id.
166 Multi-State Climate Initiatives, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS.,
http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-initiatives#WCI [https://perma.cc/
ZN9W-7T25]. This cooperative effort is facilitated by the Western Climate Initiative, Inc.
(WCI), a nonprofit organization. Id. California is also working with British Columbia and
Ontario on joint cap-and-trade efforts through WCI. Id.
167 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2017).
168 Id.
169 See id. § 38560.
170 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95497 (2017). The low-carbon fuel
standard rule has been challenged on the ground that it discriminates against out-ofstate ethanol producers and crude oil sources. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,
730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the standard is not facially discriminatory
against interstate commerce but remanding to district court for determination whether
ethanol provisions in standard discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or
effect and, if not, to apply a balancing test to those provisions). On remand, see Am. Fuels
& Petrochemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Corey, Nos. 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM, 1:10-CV-163-LJOBAM, 2015 WL 5096279, at *38–39 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2015) (granting and denying
various motions by both sides relating to the pleadings, but not dismissing the case).
163

164
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agreements so that the supplier cannot generate emissions
greater than a combined-cycle natural gas-fired power plant,
which generates approximately one-half the emissions of a
coal-fired plant.171
b. Decarbonization Strategy
In 2014, several California agencies and California’s
Independent System Operator (which operates the state’s
electricity grid) asked E3 (Energy + Environmental Economics), a
consulting firm, to analyze the technical and economic feasibility
of various pathways to meet its 2030 and 2050 emissions
reduction goals.172 Decarbonizing California’s economy, E3
concluded, requires four transitions.173 First, energy efficiency for
buildings, industry, and motor vehicles must be doubled and
there must be a significant reduction in vehicle miles traveled.174
Second, there must be “[g]reater reliance on electricity in
buildings [and] zero emission vehicles.”175 Third, renewable
sources must provide 50%–60% “of annual electricity use by
2030.”176 Fourth, liquid and gaseous fuels should be decarbonized
because sustainable biomass is insufficient in quantity to replace
those fuels.177 A fifth requirement—unrelated to energy—is that
other greenhouse gases (e.g., methane, fluorinated gases, etc.), as
well as non-energy related carbon dioxide emissions (e.g.
agriculture) must also be reduced.178 As California proceeds to
implement these recommendations and its 2016 legislation, its
efforts to address climate change have been intensifying.

171 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340 (West 2009); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 8341 (West 2008).
172 See ENERGY + ENVTL. ECON., SUMMARY OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE AGENCIES’
PATHWAYS PROJECT: LONG-TERM GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION SCENARIOS (2015),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/html/fact_sheets/e3_2030scenarios.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8JE-PM
4R]. This is the consulting firm where Jim Williams then worked.
173 Amber Mahone et al., E3, California PATHWAYS: GHG Scenario Results slide
9 (Apr. 6, 2015) (PowerPoint presentation), http://www.ethree.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
02/E3_PATHWAYS_GHG_Scenarios_Updated_April2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CGB-UJ
BU]. Further explanation and links to supporting data are available at ENERGY + ENVTL.
ECON., supra note 172.
174 Mahone et al., supra note 173, at slide 10.
175 Id. at slide 11.
176 Id. at slide 12.
177 Id. at slides 9, 13.
178 Id. at slide 14.
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2. Germany
a. Actions
The German energy strategy, known as Energiewende
(or energy transition), is intended to reduce Germany’s energy
consumption and move the economy from nuclear and fossil
fuels to renewable energy.179 The Energiewende, in turn, is
based on the same three basic building blocks as the California
program—energy efficiency, renewable energy, and direct
regulation of greenhouse gases.
Germany’s 2014 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, described
above, sets out a variety of laws, market mechanisms, and
programs that are intended to achieve the national goals of
reducing energy consumption from 2008 levels by 20% by 2020
and 50% by 2050. These include laws fostering the market for
energy efficiency services;180 laws directing the greater use of
distributed power, which increases efficiency by reducing
transmission line energy losses; programs to fund the
construction and renovation of buildings for greater efficiency;
and various energy efficiency informational programs.181 The
government achieved a 9% reduction in primary energy
consumption from 2008 levels by 2014182—which is no small
thing. Still, the government’s target of reducing primary energy
consumption in 2020 to 20% below 2008 levels183 appears
unlikely to be met.
The primary driver for increased renewable energy in
Germany is a feed-in tariff. While Germany has used feed-in
tariffs to promote renewable energy since the early 1990s, the
feed-in tariff in the Renewable Energy Sources Law of 2000
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz or EEG), which has been revised
or amended four times since then, is recognized as the principle
179 Ready for the Next Phase of the Energy Transition, GER. FED. MINISTRY
ECON. AFFAIRS & ENERGY, http://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/energytransition.html [https://perma.cc/SH4K-G48B]. For a useful overview, see Jurca, supra
note 143. The origin of the term has been traced to opponents of nuclear power in the
1970s and 1980s who wanted to show that there was an alternative way to provide
electricity. CRAIG MORRIS & MARTIN PEHNT, HEINRICH BÖLL FOUND., ENERGY
TRANSITION: THE GERMAN ENERGIEWENDE 58 (2012), https://book.energytransition.org/
sites/default/files/downloads-2016/book/German-Energy-Transition_en.pdf [https://perma.
cc/R4F6-Y47X]. The framework for this transition, which is oriented toward 2050, is set
out in a paper, Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable
Energy Supply, which was published by the German government in 2010. GERMAN FED.
MINISTRY OF ECON. & TECH. & GERMAN FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 120.
180 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN GERMANY, supra note 114, at 56.
181 3RD NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, supra note 136, at 11–14.
182 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN GERMANY, supra note 114, at 56.
183 Id.
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driver for Germany’s increased use of renewable energy.184 The
feed-in tariff in the EEG required grid operators to purchase
renewable electricity at cost-based rates for a twenty-year
period; the rates were based on the cost of renewable technologies
plus an “adder” to allow a profit, not on market rates.185 The EEG
has an undeniable effect on renewable electricity in Germany.
Between 1990 and 2000, renewable sources grew from 3.4%–6.2%
of the country’s gross electric consumption186 but soared to 31% in
2015.187 Germany supplements the EEG with other measures.
According to the National Renewable Energy Action Plan, these
include various tax incentives as well as state and municipal
funding programs.188 Additional measures promote offshore wind
energy and create regulatory and market incentives to foster the
use of renewable energy for heating.189 Yet the rapid growth in
renewable energy in Germany, and the challenges of managing
the rapidity of that growth, have led the government to agree
to a 45% cap on the fraction of electricity from renewable
sources for 2025.190
A principle part of the German effort to directly regulate
greenhouse gases is the EU Emissions Trading System, which
was launched in 2005.191 The system covers about 45% of the
EU’s greenhouse gas emissions.192 Between 1990 and 2014,
German greenhouse gas emissions covered by the emissions
trading system declined 23%.193 For all covered EU emissions in
that period, the reduction was 22.9%.194 Although the emissions
trading system is directed at greenhouse gas emissions, the
Mormann et al., supra note 28, at 81; Jurca, supra note 143, at 145–46.
Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA.
L. REV. 937, 948–49 (2014).
186 Id. at 960.
187 Germany’s Renewables Electricity Generation Grows in 2015, but Coal Still
Dominant, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 24, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=26372 [https://perma.cc/LZ3Q-K3K6].
188 FED. REPUBLIC OF GER., supra note 142, at 5–6; see also GERMAN FED.
MINISTRY OF ECON. & TECH. & GERMAN FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note
120, 7–10.
189 3RD NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, supra note 136, at 12.
190 Energy Hit: Germany’s Decision to Slow the Expansion of Green-Energy
Production Is a Reasonable Move, 534 NATURE 152, 152 (2016), http://www.nature.
com/polopoly_fs/1.20041!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/534152a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CQ62-B238].
191 See generally CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING:
LESSONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE (Michael G. Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008).
192 Greenhouse Gas Emission Statistics, EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics [https://perma.cc/LV8
E-XVDH].
193 Id. (calculation based on reduction from 1258.2 to 969.1 million metric tons
of carbon dioxide equivalent in that time period).
194 Id. (calculation based on reduction from 5735.1 to 4419.2 million metric
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in that time period).
184

185
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increased price of fossil fuel energy caused by the cost of
allowances encourages, to a modest degree, the use of both energy
efficiency and renewable energy.
The German government has also been working toward
its 2020 and 2050 targets in other ways. In 2014, it issued its
strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below
1990 levels by 2020.195 Because greenhouse gas emissions were
already 27.6% below 1990 levels in 2014, a further reduction of
12.4% is needed to meet this objective.196 The plan identifies
“key policy measures” for a wide variety of sectors and
activities, including electricity generation; building and
housing; transportation; industry, commerce, trade, and
services; waste and recycling management; agriculture; land
use, land-use change, and forestry; research and development;
and public education.197
b. Decarbonization Strategy
The German government has also been developing a
strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80%–95%
below 1990 levels by 2050.198 The German government held an
extensive stakeholder outreach and input process in 2015 on
this strategy.199 The government says this reduction is achievable
and can be made affordable and publicly acceptable.200 The
strategy is to be based on four pillars: “paving the way” for
renewable energy and energy efficiency, “[d]esigning the exit
game for the high-carbon assets,” developing the necessary
infrastructure, and making a great many innovations that are
now in the design-and-demonstration phase “work in time.”201
Pursuant to the Paris Agreement, the German government in late

195 GERMAN FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION, BUILDING
& NUCLEAR SAFETY, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PROGRAMME 2020
(2014), http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Broschueren/aktionsprogra
mm_klimaschutz_2020_broschuere_en_bf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7W2-4GNK] [hereinafter
CLIMATE ACTION PROGRAMME 2020].
196 See supra Table 2.
197 CLIMATE ACTION PROGRAMME 2020, supra note 195, at 24–71. They also
include emissions trading and cooperation with the EU. Id.
198 Felix C. Matthes, Recent Greenhouse Gas Emission and Energy Trends,
Prospects and Lessons from Long-Term Modeling for Germany (Dec. 9, 2015) (PowerPoint
Presentation given at side event at U.N. Conference on Climate Change, Paris, France)
(on file with author).
199 See Megan Darby, Germany Mulls ‘Mammoth’ 95% Cut in Emissions by
2050, CLIMATE HOME (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/03/18/
germany-mulls-minimal-carbon-emissions-in-a-generation/ [https://perma.cc/N8B5-66AZ].
200 Matthes, supra note 198, at slide 6.
201 Id.
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2016 submitted its decarbonization strategy for 2050—just as this
article was going to press.202
The DDPP has also developed a decarbonization strategy
for Germany, which concludes that “deep decarbonization can be
achieved in Germany by 2050.”203 It explains that “a huge amount
of theoretical and practical knowledge on transformation
processes” exists because of “about 30 years of critical engagement
with climate and energy policies in Germany.”204 Still, challenges
remain. While there has been significant progress in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions since 1990, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by 80%–95% by 2050 will require annual reductions of
3.5%, which is equal to the greatest annual reductions ever
achieved in the country.205
The German DDPP team analyzed three alreadydeveloped decarbonization scenarios for Germany out of dozens
that have been released in recent years.206 Significantly, one of
the scenarios shows that “most of the government’s climate and
energy targets are missed,” and indicates how the country’s
energy system needs to change to meet those targets.207 Three
strategies are significant in all three scenarios: increased energy
efficiency in all sectors, but particularly in buildings; greater use
of renewable sources for electricity generation; and greater use
of electricity (including electricity for heat) as well as electricitybased hydrogen and synthetic fuels.208 None of these scenarios
consider nuclear energy or carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) because there is “little acceptance” of these technologies
within Germany.209 The report, nonetheless, acknowledged that
certain, “more controversial” mitigation strategies could also be
employed, including behavioral change that brings about lower

202 FED. MINISTRY FOR ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION, BUILDING & NUCLEAR
SAFETY, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2050: PRINCIPLES AND GOALS OF THE GERMAN
GOVERNMENT’S CLIMATE POLICY (2016), http://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/
application/pdf/161114_climate_action_plan_2050_en_bf.pdf [https://perma.cc/66MM-96
K7]. The text of the entire plan is available in German. KLIMASCHUTZPLAN:
KLIMASCHUTZPOLITISCHE GRUNDSÄTZE UND ZIELE DER BUNDESREGIERUNG 2050 (2016),
http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/klimasch
utzplan_2050_bf.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SJ9-XYYT].
203 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN GERMANY, supra note 114, at 64.
204 Id. at 6.
205 Id. at 3.
206 Id. at 12–16. These scenarios were chosen because, among other reasons,
they were issued recently (2014) and because they achieve the German target of at
least an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, “at least with regard to
energy-related emissions.” Id. at 14.
207 Id. at 16.
208 Id. at 30–41.
209 Id. at 4.
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energy demand, “[n]et imports of electricity or bioenergy,” and
the use of CCS for industrial emissions.210
While the report summarizes a variety of German laws
and policies relating to energy and climate change, it also
concludes that changes in those laws and policies are needed for
each of the three key strategies if deep decarbonization is to be
achieved.211 A key problem affecting all three strategies
lies in the fact that the German “Energiewende” is not centrally
organized but influenced and regulated by different levels of governance
(EU, national level, federal states, regions and municipalities). While
different tasks need to be carried out on each of these levels, successfully
managing climate and energy policy from a multi-level perspective
constitutes a challenge in itself.212

The report identified additional policy measures that
are needed to achieve Germany’s goals for each of the three
strategies. For energy efficiency, many different barriers to
greater energy efficiency exist, and each must be overcome by
different approaches.213 Strengthened EU vehicle efficiency
standards would also help, as would municipal government and
public utility outreach to the general public on ways to improve
energy efficiency.214 To increase public support for the second
strategy—greater use of renewable energy—the report says
that feed-in tariffs “should be gradually replaced by marketbased feed-in premiums.”215 Because market-based premiums
involve a lower cost than feed-in tariffs, they should have the
effect of lowering the cost of renewable energy and making it
more publicly acceptable. Again, both EU policies and
municipal actions can foster renewable energy—the former by
increasing financial support and the latter by, among other
things, using public energy utilities to install their own
renewable energy facilities.216 Finally, the third strategy—
greater electrification—requires “a consistent and stable policy
framework . . . to be established,” as well as greater research
and development on technologically difficult problems such as
storage.217 Germany has already made substantial progress
toward decarbonization by a variety of different actions,
210 Id. at 42–46. Another option is to reduce agricultural emissions of greenhouse
gases, which are not related to the production of energy. Id. at 46–48.
211 Id. at 55–63.
212 Id. at 55.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 57–58.
215 Id. at 59.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 63. Stronger EU support is also needed. Id.
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through considerable analytical work and an extensive
stakeholder process.
3. The United States
a. Actions
U.S. climate change efforts have also focused on energy
efficiency, renewable energy, and direct regulation of
greenhouse gases. In many ways, however, states—including,
but not limited to California—as well as local governments and
regional organizations have been more ambitious than the
federal government.
Federal energy efficiency laws for motor vehicles and
appliances that date back to the 1970s are now being employed
more aggressively not only for energy efficiency but also to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.218 In 2010, EPA and the
Department of Transportation (DOT) adopted a final regulation
increasing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
for light-duty motor vehicles to a combined average emissions
level of 250 grams of carbon dioxide per mile, or 35.5 miles per
gallon, by 2016, if manufacturers meet them entirely with fuel
efficiency improvements.219 Then, in 2012, EPA and DOT issued
further rules for passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and
medium-duty passenger vehicles for model years 2017–2025.220
The final standards are projected to result in even lower
emissions—an average industry fleet-wide level of 163 grams per
mile of carbon dioxide in model year 2025, which is equivalent to
54.5 miles per gallon if achieved exclusively through fuel economy
improvements.221 EPA and DOT have also adopted the first-ever
regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve fuel
efficiency of medium- and heavy-duty trucks.222
The Department of Energy has adopted and strengthened
energy efficiency standards for a wide variety of products,
218 John C. Dernbach & Marianne Tyrrell, Federal Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Laws, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 25,
27–34 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).
219 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,329–30 (May 7, 2010)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536).
220 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,624 (Oct. 15,
2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600).
221 Id. at 62,627.
222 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106, 57,106 (Sept. 15,
2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600,1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1065, 1066, 1068).
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including new refrigerators, air conditioners, clothes washers,
and furnaces.223 The Department of Energy has also adopted
efficiency standards for electric motors and a variety of other
equipment.224 Taken together, these standards cover “more
than 60 products, representing about 90% of home energy use,
60% of commercial building energy use, and approximately 30%
of industrial energy use.”225 State and local governments have
also supported greater energy efficiency through tax incentives,
purchasing requirements, and more stringent standards than
those of the federal government.226
The federal government has played a fairly aggressive, if
controversial, role in requiring the increased use of renewable
energy in gasoline and other liquid fuels,227 but has played a less
direct role concerning renewable electricity. Renewable
electricity in the United States has grown largely as a result of
state renewable portfolio standards, net-metering laws, feed-in
tariffs, and other state laws,228 supported by, among other
things, federal tax incentives.229
The United States has also begun to venture into direct
regulation of greenhouse gases. Some 8000 facilities are now
required to report their greenhouse gas emissions.230 EPA has
also begun to use its authority under the Clean Air Act to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new and existing
stationary sources. The most prominent example, already
See 10 C.F.R. § 430.32 (2013).
See id. pt. 431.
225 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SAVING ENERGY AND MONEY WITH APPLIANCE AND
EQUIPMENT STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
2015/07/f24/Appliance%20and%20Equipment%20Standards%20Fact%20Sheet%207-2115.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZJ3-WETX].
226 Alexandra B. Klass & John K. Harting, State and Municipal Energy
Efficiency Laws, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES, supra
note 218, at 57.
227 See Timothy A. Slating & Jay P. Kesan, The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?
Moving Forward with the Federal Biofuel Mandate, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 374 (2014).
228 See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621
(2015); Joshua P. Fershee, Renewables Mandates and Goals, in THE LAW OF CLEAN
ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES, supra note 218, at 77. Renewable portfolio
standards, like the one in California, require a specified percentage of a state’s electricity to
come from renewable sources. See supra text accompanying notes 155–156. Feed-in tariffs,
like the one in Germany, require the payment of a specified fee for new renewable energy for
a particular period. See supra text accompanying note 184. A net-metering law allows
homeowners and residents that generate more electricity than they can use to sell the
excess to the grid. Valerie J. Faden, Net Metering of Renewable Energy: How Traditional
Electricity Suppliers Fight to Keep You in the Dark, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 109, 109 (2000).
229 Roberta F. Mann & E. Margaret Rowe, Taxation, in THE LAW OF CLEAN
ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES, supra note 218, at 145, 146–49.
230 See 40 C.F.R. § 98 (2010); EPA, FACT SHEET: GREENHOUSE GASES
REPORTING PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2014-09/documents/ghgfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/328P-R9QR].
223

224
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noted, is the Clean Power Plan, which would reduce
greenhouse gases from existing electric generating facilities to
32% below 2005 levels by 2030.231 A variety of other actions are
contained in a Climate Change Action Plan issued by the White
House in 2013.232 In many ways, however, regional, state, and
local actions have been more aggressive than those of the
federal government.233
b. Decarbonization Strategy
The DDPP has prepared two deep decarbonization
reports for the United States.234 In addition, in November 2016,
just as this article was going to press, the U.S. government
submitted its deep decarbonization strategy for 2050.235 At
about the same time, the Risky Business Project, which was
founded by former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson, and
businessman and philanthropist Tom Steyer,236 issued its own
decarbonization strategy for the United States, entitled From
Risk to Return, Investing in a Clean Energy Economy.237 The
two more recent reports draw substantially the same
conclusions on major issues as the DDPP reports because they
share many of the same methodologies and authors.238
The two DDPP reports, taken together, make
remarkably clear the gap between current law and the laws
231 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,736 n.384 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
232 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 10–
11 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateaction
plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR27-MCFL]. President Trump’s Executive Order also rescinded
the Climate Action Plan. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094, § 3(b) (Mar.
31, 2017).
233 See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW chs. 9–12 (Michael B. Gerrard
& Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014).
234 See DDPP U.S. TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 94; DDPP U.S. POLICY
REPORT, supra note 73.
235 See THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES MID-CENTURY STRATEGY FOR DEEP
DECARBONIZATION (John Carey et al. eds., 2016), http://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_
strategies/application/pdf/mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3RKK-6GAQ].
236 About Us, RISKY BUS., https://riskybusiness.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/7X
UP-Y3QJ].
237 TIM DUANE ET AL., RISKY BUS., FROM RISK TO RETURN: INVESTING IN A
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY (2016), https://riskybusiness.org/fromrisktoreturn/ (links to
report, four appendices, and case study).
238 Id. at 70 (acknowledging substantial research assistance from DDPP and
DDPP authors); Ben Haley, DDPP Informs US Climate Strategy, EVOLVED ENERGY
RESEARCH (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.evolved.energy/single-post/2016/11/16/DeepDecarboniation-Pathways-Project-Informs-US-Climate-Strategy [https://perma.cc/W6DCEPW7].
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that are needed to achieve deep decarbonization. Perhaps the
DDPP’s “most important finding is that it is technically feasible
for the U.S. to reduce [carbon dioxide] emissions from fossil fuel
combustion” to 85% below 1990 levels by 2050, which is “an order
of magnitude decrease in per capita emissions compared to
2010.”239 If the United States did that, it could reduce its overall
greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.240
Enormous changes would be required in the U.S. energy
system to make those reductions happen. Because it is difficult to
decarbonize gas and liquid fuels, the researchers said, meeting
the 2050 objective would require almost complete decarbonization
of electricity and, among other things, switching a “large share” of
end uses that require gasoline and liquid fuels over to electricity
(such as electric cars).241 It would also be necessary to produce
fuel from electricity itself, they said, citing the production of
hydrogen from electrolysis as an example.242 That would double
electricity generation but reduce carbon intensity to between 3%
and 10% of current levels, requiring a vast increase in either
renewable energy (as much as “2,500 gigawatts (GW) of wind and
solar generation (30 times present capacity)”) or carbon capture
and sequestration.243 The average fuel economy for light-duty
vehicles, such as cars, would need to be over 100 miles per gallon,
and these vehicles would need to be fueled almost entirely by
electricity and hydrogen.244
According to the report, the future of the U.S. energy
system depends on at least “five critical elements.”245 These are
(1) the commercial availability of carbon capture and storage
(CCS), (2) the supply and allocation of biomass energy
feedstock that can displace fossil fuel, (3) the sources of energy
used for electricity production, (4) the “balancing” strategies
that are employed to keep the electricity grid reliable, and (5)
the uptake of energy efficiency and switching to low-carbon
fuels.246 Decisions on these five elements open or close
pathways to decarbonization. For example, if CCS is not
239 DDPP 2014 REPORT, supra note 81, at 204. “Technical feasibility is defined here
as a robust analytical demonstration that multiple technology pathways exist for achieving
the 2050 emissions target that satisfy a broad set of reasonableness criteria, including
reliance on commercial or near-commercial technologies, natural infrastructure turnover,
power system operability, and sustainability limits on natural resources.” DDPP U.S.
TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 94, at 2.
240 DDPP U.S. TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 94, at xii.
241 Id. at xiv.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 14.
246 Id. at 14–15.
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commercially available, there is no future for fossil fuels for
electricity, and the only remaining sources for electricity are
renewable and nuclear power.247
The DDP researchers developed four different
decarbonization scenarios for the United States, which highlight
the role of some of these critical elements and also illustrate the
variety of potential approaches. Because electricity is at the
center of a decarbonized energy system, the scenarios highlight
contrasting ways of providing it. These four scenarios are High
Nuclear, High Renewables, High CCS (fossil fuels with CCS),
and Mixed Case (based on “a balanced mix of all three primary
energy resources”).248
The DDPP researchers concluded that certain key policy
objectives for this energy transition must be met. These are:
• Anticipate investment needs and build a suitable investment
environment
• Incorporate future carbon consequences in current purchasing
decisions
• Create stable drivers for sustained long-term transitions
• Develop institutional structures for coordination across sectors
• Integrate supply and demand-side planning and procurement
• Create the right kinds of competition
• Enable the required rates of consumer adoption
• Catalyze the needed cost reductions in key technologies
• Limit cost increases faced by consumers
• Minimize inequitable distributional effects249

These objectives make plain the basic policy structure for
redirecting the entire energy system. For example: “The annual
investment requirement for low-carbon and efficient technologies
rises from under $100 billion today to over $1 trillion in a span of
about 20 years.”250 The policy and legal signals necessary to
sustain this transition, moreover, must be consistent enough over
time to create a “predictable investment environment.”251

247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
DDPP U.S. POLICY REPORT, supra note 73, at 61.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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Across all four scenarios, the overall cost to the U.S.
economy in 2050, the report says, is about $320 billion (or 0.8%
of the expected GDP for 2050 of $40 trillion).252 Average monthly
household spending on energy goods and services would be only
$35 higher in 2050 than it would otherwise be; somewhat higher
electricity prices are mostly offset by lower costs for gasoline
and natural gas.253 DDPP assumes very little change in
personal lifestyles, and suggests that the “seeming paradox” of
decarbonization is that, while the required changes are
enormous, “the day to day interaction of most people with using
energy goods and services will change very little.”254
DDPP makes clear that the scale of required changes
from existing law is considerable, though these changes are not
set out in any detail. The following illustrate the magnitude of
the differences. To begin with, because the Clean Power Plan
does not begin to get to the necessary scale of changes needed
(e.g., deep decarbonization, redesign of wholesale electricity
markets), it must be modified or augmented by other state and
federal laws.255 In addition, the federal renewable fuel standard
for liquid fuels should be changed so that, among other things,
it is based on “near zero lifecycle carbon” and is used for diesel
fuel, jet fuel, or natural gas, where it “has much greater carbon
benefit.”256 Moreover, CAFE standards for motor vehicles “must
become more aggressive in transforming the vehicle fleet” so
that virtually the entire fleet is made up of “electric, fuel cell,
or plug-in hybrid vehicles” by 2040.257 Finally, energy efficiency
standards for buildings, as well as buildings themselves, need to
be refocused on carbon emissions, not primary energy use; less
efficiency in use of energy from a renewable source is probably
better from a carbon perspective than greater efficiency in use of
energy from a fossil fuel source.258
The United States has made growing progress in
addressing greenhouse gas emissions in recent years and the
DDPP describes various decarbonization scenarios. Still, while
California’s and Germany’s decarbonization efforts have a long
way to go, they are considerably ahead of the United States’.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 28.
254 Id. at 24. The report adds: “Lifestyle changes, such as use of bicycles in lieu
of cars, vegetarian diets, and wearing sweaters to reduce home heating loads, are not
required, though by lowering energy service demand these measures could reduce the
amount of low-carbon technology that must be deployed, and potentially lower costs.” Id.
255 Id. at 85–86.
256 Id. at 87–88.
257 Id. at 89–90.
258 Id. at 91–92.
252

253
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LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA AND GERMANY

California and Germany offer considerable insight into
what legal pathways the United States should employ in
seeking decarbonization and what overall approaches should
guide the choice of specific legal pathways. Some of these concern
enabling conditions and frames for those legal pathways—
particularly, widespread public support, the use of sustainable
development to address climate change, and the use of long-term
and sector-specific targets and timetables with accompanying
strategies. Others involve law and governance issues about legal
pathways—laws as building blocks, sequencing, learning from
experience about the efficacy of various laws, and coordinated
governance. These lessons can help guide U.S. efforts to
accelerate the reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions.
A.

Enabling Conditions and Frames
1. Public Support and Participation

In democracies, of course, public support and participation
are essential for the adoption or modification of laws and policies.
This public support, as suggested earlier, also needs to continue
over decades if governments are to maintain consistent and
relatively unchanged policies necessary to support the long-term
investments and actions essential for decarbonization.259
Moreover, it is increasingly clear that human behavioral change
can be a significant component of any national strategy to address
climate change, affecting the uptake of new technologies and the
adoption of new approaches.260 Widespread public support makes
these behavioral changes more likely. Finally, public support is
needed because decarbonization efforts necessarily involve trial
and error; there are bound to be reversals and failures in an

259 UK PATHWAYS ANALYSIS, supra note 83, at 4 (“Creating a low carbon economy
will require the consent and participation of citizens given the scale and pace of change
required. Government can play a leadership role, but transforming our economy will require
a coalition of citizens, business, and the energy industry.”).
260 Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge:
Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10547 (2010) (identifying six principles for the design of policies to induce changes in
household technology adoption and use and evaluating recent federal household energy
initiatives in light of those six principles); Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can
Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 18452 (2009) (concluding that national implementation of seventeen different
household actions could reduce overall US carbon dioxide emissions by 7.4%, with little or
no reduction in household well-being).
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unprecedented effort of this magnitude, and public support
needs to be unwavering even when inevitable problems occur.
Such public support exists in California and Germany.
California’s efforts to address climate change have been supported
and furthered by both Republican and Democratic governors, and
California adults are more likely to think climate change is a
serious problem than adults in the rest of the United States.261
Indeed, a referendum to delay implementation of AB 32 was
defeated in 2010.262 Remarkably, polling data consistently
indicate that more than 90% of the German public support the
Energiewende.263 Public support in Germany continues
notwithstanding continued criticism that the feed-in tariff has
contributed to an increase in electricity costs.264
In the United States, by contrast, the national Republican
Party appears virtually united in its opposition to serious action
on climate change (at least in public), and partisan division has
made it impossible for the U.S. Congress to adopt significant
legislation on climate change.265 While climate change was not a
major issue in Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, he
was openly skeptical of climate change science and claimed that
regulation of fossil fuels weakens the economy.266 His March 2017
executive order is unquestionably intended to roll back or weaken
the climate change efforts of the Obama administration.267
There are, nonetheless, signs that the partisan division may be
abating—but they are only signs. In a March 2016 Gallup poll,
261 Chris Megerian, In Paris, Schwarzenegger and Brown Unite to Seek Climate
Action, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-paris-climatetalks-schwarzenegger-brown-story.html [https://perma.cc/C8NU-7EY3]; David Kordus,
Californians’ Views on Climate Change, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Jan. 2017), http://
www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=1172 [https://perma.cc/BPD8-TUPG].
262 Colin Sullivan & Debra Kahn, Voters Reject 2-Sided Assault on Climate
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/11/03/03climate
wire-voters-reject-2-sided-assault-on-climate-law-13439.html?pagewanted=all [https://
perma.cc/N66H-XBV8].
263 Do Germans Support the Energiewende?, HENIRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG FOUND.,
https://book.energytransition.org/do-germans-support-energiewende/ [https://perma.cc/82
KX-Z6B4]; AGORA ENERGIEWENDE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE ENERGIEWENDE 10
(2015), https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_
EW/Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T8C-MKD6].
264 See AGORA ENERGIEWENDE ET AL., supra note 263, at 31–32; see also Bentham
Paulos, Are the Legacy Costs of Germany’s Solar Feed-In Tariff Fixable?, GREENTECH MEDIA
(June 4, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/germany-moves-to-reform-itsrenewable-energy-law [https://perma.cc/6ZRD-8M35] (explaining German policy response to
high electricity costs from feed-in tariff).
265 Riley E. Dunlap et al., The Political Divide on Climate Change: Partisan
Polarization Widens in the U.S., 58 ENV’T.: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 4, 5 (2016).
266 Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donaldtrump-climate-change-skeptic-denial/510359/ [https://perma.cc/JYJ5-4WAS].
267 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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a record number (65%) of “Americans [are] now saying increases
in the Earth’s temperature over the last century are primarily
attributable to human activities rather than natural causes,” and
a significantly increased, but lower, number of Republicans (40%)
feel the same way.268 It is likely that the economic development
and job creation opportunities provided by renewable energy and
energy efficiency269 will eventually lead to greater future
Republican support for action on climate change, including
Republican presidential support. It is likely, in other words, that
they will see climate change action through the lens of
sustainable development.
2. Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is a decision-making framework
for reconciling and furthering economic development, social wellbeing, and security with environmental protection.270 The term
grew out of the realization that conventional development—which
includes both economic and social development, and is based on
security—was causing widespread and growing environmental
degradation and also causing or contributing to poverty and social
inequality.271 Sustainable development is an effort to transform
the way in which development is conducted.272 The basic idea is
that development should have not only social, economic, and
security goals but should also have environmental goals.273 This
transformation—from conventional development to sustainable
development—requires the integration of development and
environment in decision making.274
268 Lydia Saad & Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Concern About Global Warming at
Eight-Year High, GALLUP (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190010/concernglobal-warming-eight-year-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z2KX-UCE5]. But see Dunlap et
al., supra note 265.
269 Jim Marston, What Trump And Pence Don’t Get About Clean Energy Jobs,
FORBES (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/edfenergyexchange/2016/12/02/whattrump-and-pence-dont-get-about-clean-energy-jobs/2/#6433094d3db8 [https://perma.cc/DT
5Y-6AYT].
270 John C. Dernbach & Federico Cheever, Sustainable Development and Its
Discontents, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 247 (2015); John C. Dernbach, Sustainable
Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1998)
[hereinafter Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance].
The pathways described in the sixteen DDPP country reports are all based on the use
sustainable development to create economic, social, environmental, and other benefits.
DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 21–28.
271 Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance,
supra note 270, at 8–24.
272 See Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 270, at 273.
273 Id. at 252–76.
274 Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance,
supra note 270, at 50–58.
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Sustainable development is a central idea of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change: “The Parties have
a right to, and should, promote sustainable development.”275 If
decarbonization achieves an environmental goal—protection of
the climate—then designing legal decarbonization pathways
for sustainable development means designing them for
economic, security, social, and other environmental co-benefits.
Achieving multiple benefits through a single policy can
increase public support for that policy and make it more cost
effective.276 This is particularly important for climate change
because reductions in greenhouse gas emissions do not produce
local benefits; the co-benefits of those measures do. Designing
legal measures that maximize these co-benefits is a key
element in getting these measures adopted.
National laws that allow subnational governments such
as states and municipalities to particularize implementation to
local circumstances, for example, may lead to greater cobenefits than more uniform laws.277 Deep decarbonization legal
pathways that rely more on a properly motivated public, and
individual efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, are
likely to be less expensive than the cost of other measures.278 It
is also essential to draft measures in ways that protect the poor
and manage the impact of the transition on the fossil fuel
industry. Thus, legal pathways based on sustainable development
could identify the most attractive and politically achievable legal
pathways for keeping the temperature increase well below 2°C.
The executive orders and laws that are at the
foundation of California’s climate change effort all set out the
threats that climate change poses to the state and the economic
development, job creation, and other benefits of action to address
climate change.279 Germany’s energy transition is expressly
framed in terms of sustainability and is premised on the country
becoming one “of the most energy-efficient and greenest
economies in the world while enjoying competitive energy prices
and a high level of prosperity.”280 There is significant evidence of
Framework Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.4.
PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN GERMANY, supra note 114, at 48.
277 John C. Dernbach et al., Making the States Full Partners in a National
Climate Change Effort: A Necessary Element for Sustainable Economic Development, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,597 (2010).
278 See Dietz et al., supra note 260, at 18453.
279 Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (Cal. 2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38501(a)–(e) (West 2007).
280 GERMAN FED. MINISTRY OF ECON. & TECH. & GERMAN FED. MINISTRY FOR
THE ENV’T, supra note 120, at 3. For Germany, co-benefits include energy security. “In
2013, Germany imported 98% of oil consumed domestically, 88% of gas, and 87% of
coal . . . .” PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN GERMANY, supra note 114, at 49.
275

276
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job creation in the solar and wind industries in California and
Germany.281 California is also framing its effort in terms of
reducing vulnerabilities to climate change, including the
vulnerability of water supplies to drought.282 The old frame—that
people must forfeit their well-being to address climate change—is
being refuted not simply with arguments, but with evidence. In
fact, an effort to repeal California’s AB 32 by public referendum in
2010 was defeated largely on the strength of the economic
development and public health benefits of AB 32. California relied
on similar arguments in adopting legislation in 2016 to
strengthen its ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.283
Indeed, the DDPP report for the United States identifies
four broad categories of co-benefits that could be used to guide the
development of possible legal pathways. These include, of course,
a stable climate and clean environment, not only because of its
obvious climate protection benefits, but also because a “deeply
decarbonized energy system lowers air pollution, improves public
health, reduces fossil fuel related disasters, and promotes
environmental justice.”284 A decarbonized energy system also has
“much more predictable energy costs and a more stable investment
environment” than the existing system with continuing oil-price
fluctuations and resource availability issues.285 In addition, a
“deeply decarbonized energy system has many more potential
economic winners than the current system, due to dramatically
increased and widely distributed investment across regions,
technologies, energy types, and industries.”286 Finally,
decarbonization will have significant benefits for economic
modernization, U.S. competitiveness, and job creation—
particularly in the electricity sector—because decarbonization is
based on U.S. strengths in science and technology.287 The
United States can enhance the likelihood of making greater
progress by framing the climate change issue in sustainability
Other co-benefits include “higher competitiveness of and global business opportunities
for companies, job creation, stronger GDP growth, smaller energy bills for households
and less air pollution.” Id. at 5, 50–54.
281 Mormann et al., supra note 28, at 74–75.
282 RUTH LANGRIDGE ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA CRUZ, CLIMATE CHANGE
AND WATER SUPPLY SECURITY: RECONFIGURING GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT TO
REDUCE DROUGHT VULNERABILITY 1–2 (2012), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/
CEC-500-2012-017/CEC-500-2012-017.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS75-FWAM].
283 Chris Megerian & Liam Dillon, Gov. Brown Signs Sweeping Legislation to
Combat Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/lapol-ca-jerry-brown-signs-climate-laws-20160908-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/44LYHRSF].
284 DDPP U.S. POLICY REPORT, supra note 73, at 34.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 34, 47.
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terms—creating economic, social, and environment benefits;
reducing costs; and enhancing human quality of life in the present
and over the long term. The United States may or may not take
this approach, but the benefits of doing so cannot reasonably be
denied.
3. Long-Term and Sector-Specific Targets and
Timetables with Accompanying Strategies
Targets and timetables based on decarbonization are
essential to any jurisdiction’s effort to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.288 Targets and timetables are the only way to match
the required effort, including law, policy, funding, and
technological development and deployment, to the reductions
needed. They provide an organizing framework around which
many actions from different sectors can be conducted.289 Targets
and timetables also serve as a measure of the effectiveness of the
laws and policies that are adopted and implemented to achieve
them. When long-term goals are involved, these short-term
targets and timetables can provide milestones or benchmarks for
progress toward such goals. Although the United States does not
have a long-term goal, all three jurisdictions have short-term
economy-wide goals to guide progress and assess what
additional actions, if any, need to be undertaken.
The more specific short-term goals in California and
Germany also have considerable value. Because California’s
renewable portfolio standard both sets goals and provides a
legal requirement for achieving them, it is particularly likely to
be effective. In Germany, even the probability that some
specific goals for 2020 will be met (energy efficiency) or not met
(renewable energy and perhaps greenhouse gas emissions)
influences whether additional measures are undertaken.290
The absence of a firm, long-term economy-wide goal for
the United States, however, is problematic. U.S. law tends to
be oriented toward the next technologically or economically
feasible step (e.g., CAFE standards), which does not take into
288 See generally John C. Dernbach, Targets, Timetables and Effective
Implementing Mechanisms: Necessary Building Blocks for Sustainable Development, 27
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 79 (2002) (explaining the value of targets and
timetables in environmental protection).
289 “Goals, even if imperfect, may be necessary as a focal point around which
support can be mobilized and the fairness of each country’s mitigation commitments
can be judged.” Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 227–28 (2015).
290 The goals announced by the Obama administration in 2015 and 2016 for
renewable energy, energy productivity, and clean energy will have the same value if
they are treated seriously by subsequent administrations and by Congress.
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consideration what is actually required by 2050. It can thus
easily have the effect of reducing the level of ambition required
to achieve a long-term goal. Assuming that the United States
can achieve 54.5 miles per gallon as a fleet-wide average for
new vehicles by 2025, for example, how does it achieve a fleetwide average of more than 100 miles per gallon for all vehicles
by 2050? As the deep decarbonization report for the United States
explained, “[t]his would require the deployment of roughly 300
million alternative fuel vehicles by 2050.”291 Long-term goals
would oblige policy makers to consider that question and develop
credible and workable laws and policies that answer it, at the
same time as they develop shorter-term laws and policies. It
seems likely that the United States will require a much higher
level of ambition regarding motor vehicles’ fuel efficiency between
2025 and 2050 to achieve the outcome described in the deep
decarbonization report. It also seems possible that a more
ambitious 2025 standard or goal would have better positioned the
United States to achieve the required reductions.292
In the decarbonization context, a long-term goal also is
necessary to avoid dead ends—legal approaches that seem to
reduce emissions for a while but ultimately cannot deliver the
scale or pace of reductions needed.293 Without CCS, shale gas
represents such a dead end. The use of shale gas for electricity
emits about half as much carbon dioxide as the use of coal and
is given some of the credit for somewhat lower U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions in recent years.294 Still, an emissions reduction of
50% is not enough for deep decarbonization. This conclusion
does not even consider the leakage of methane (a more potent
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide) from shale gas wells,
compressor stations, and other facilities.295 Reliance on shale
gas without CCS to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is highly
unlikely to meet any credible long-term reduction goal.
Long-term thinking is also necessary to anticipate forks
in the road with long-term consequences. Zero-emission
vehicles provide an example. If those vehicles are powered by
electricity, then an electricity-charging infrastructure needs to
DDPP U.S. TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 94, at xiv.
Cf. Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 82 (2014) (“[T]he fundamental climate change policy choice for
America is between a decarbonization strategy that will be ‘difficult to accomplish’ and
the conventional multi-decade emissions-reduction approaches that are ‘certain to fail.’”).
293 See Williams et al., supra note 78, at slide 9.
294 EPA, supra note 124, at ES-23 tbl.ES-7, ES-24.
295 Donald A. Brown, Is Shale Gas Part of a Sustainable Solution to Climate
Change? A Factual and Ethical Analysis, in SHALE GAS AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY: LAW
AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABILITY 271 (John C. Dernbach & James R. May eds., 2016).
291
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be developed and located where people live, work, or go to school.
If those vehicles are powered by hydrogen fuel cells, then
hydrogen production must occur at a much greater scale.296
Finally, long-term goals and thinking are needed because
some of the hardest issues (e.g., availability of specific
technologies and costs) involve goods and services that are
marketed globally.297 Improvements over time are highly likely
to reduce costs, leading to tipping points for adoption of new lowcarbon or zero-carbon goods and services that quickly become
deployed at scale. The German feed-in tariff, for example, has
led to reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic technology.298
Similarly, a deep decarbonization goal for 2050 would put
financial markets, investors, and fossil fuel companies on
notice of long-term changes and would provide for a more
orderly transition.299
B.

Law and Governance
1. Laws as Building Blocks

Many laws are needed to make decarbonization work.
While there continue to be advocates for silver bullets, such as
carbon taxes and technological breakthroughs, the reality is that
a variety of legal and policy tools (silver buckshot) are required
to make decarbonization work.300 Because greenhouse gases are
emitted by a variety of different economic sectors—including
transportation, industry, residential dwellings, commercial
establishments, and agriculture—laws that are specifically
targeted to one of those sectors are more likely to effectively
address the specific conditions, technologies, and behaviors that
occur in that sector. Greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles, for instance, raise a different set of legal and policy
issues than greenhouse gas emissions from residential
dwellings. Pollutants other than carbon dioxide (nitrous oxide,
methane, fluorinated gases, black carbon, etc.) require
See Williams et al., supra note 78, at slide 10.
See id. at slide 11.
298 See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
299 Id.
300 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 21–22 (1990) (“Policy analysts who would recommend a single
prescription for commons problems have paid little attention to how diverse institutional
arrangements operate in practice.”); Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & John
C. Dernbach, Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United
States That Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
227, 240 (2008) (“The combination of different actions and mechanisms across all of the
relevant sectors is critical to meeting strong new emissions targets.”).
296
297
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specifically tailored laws. Finally, there is also abundant
evidence that higher charges for energy or carbon by
themselves cannot effectively address a variety of behavioral
and other issues that require context-specific laws. Even
though Germany has high energy prices, which have fostered
greater energy efficiency, the absence of more specific efficiency
laws is one of the reasons that country is not on course to meet
its energy efficiency target for 2020.301
Germany and California have been able to increase the
share of their electricity provided by renewable sources because of
a diverse range of legal and policy instruments that are directed
at what is required for both solar and wind energy.302 Although
the United States is farther from decarbonization, it too has used
a variety of legal instruments to address energy efficiency,
renewable energy, and climate change. In the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan,303 a key feature of
the Obama administration’s climate strategy, some of the nation’s
leading legal scholars published a paper arguing that EPA should
consider using another tool, Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, to
regulate greenhouse gases through that Act’s state
implementation plan process.304 That approach is consistent with
a strategy built on multiple legal building blocks.
2. Sequencing
While a variety of legal building blocks can yield an
outcome that is more tailored to the specific sectors or problems at
issue, a variety of legal building blocks also enable sequencing of
measures over time. In the carbon tax example given above, one
could argue that such a tax could have the effect of reducing
emissions from both motor vehicles and residential dwellings.
But Republican opposition means that a carbon tax at the U.S.
federal level is not likely to be enacted in the near future.305
Another problem with waiting for the right political
PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN GERMANY, supra note 114, at 55–56.
Mormann et al., supra note 28, at 90–92. Because Texas law has focused on
wind rather than solar power, by contrast, the use of wind for electricity has grown much
more than the use of solar. Id. at 91–92.
303 See supra text accompanying note 17.
304 MICHAEL BURGER ET AL., SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUMBIA
LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL PATHWAYS TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER
SECTION 115 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/
microsites/climate-change/legal_pathways_to_reducing_ghg_emissions_under_section_115_
of_the_caa.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RQ7-ZMXX].
305 See William Gale, A Tax Even Conservatives Can Love, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016-02-22/the-nextpresident-should-implement-the-carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/776U-MWM6].
301
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circumstances and timing for adoption of an optimal instrument,
moreover, is that these circumstances are almost impossible to
know in advance.306 Because waiting for a “best” solution to
climate change before acting will almost certainly have serious
and irreversible economic, human, and environmental costs, a
series of partial measures enacted now can, if nothing else, slow
down the rate at which greenhouse gases accumulate in the
atmosphere.307 Moreover, there is significant empirical evidence
that the employment of other legal tools that foster energy
efficiency and renewable energy can create a political
environment more amenable to a carbon tax by building
industries that operate as a counterweight to fossil fuel interests.
Nearly two-thirds of the countries and subnational jurisdictions
that had adopted a carbon pricing scheme by 2013, for example,
had previously adopted renewable energy portfolio standards or
feed-in tariffs for renewable energy.308
Climate change efforts in California, Germany, and the
United States all began with significant energy efficiency laws
that had nothing to do with climate change. The effect of these
laws was to reduce the amount of energy that needs to be used
in the first place. These laws have proven foundational for
subsequent climate change efforts because of their avoided
carbon dioxide emissions. They also suggest that energy
efficiency and conservation efforts should continue, albeit
toward more ambitious zero-carbon outcomes. These measures
are, for the most part, politically feasible now, and there is no
need for additional information.
Building on this insight, the DDPP recommends that
the policies and measures that should be prioritized in time are
those (1) “that are common to all pathways (e.g. electrification
using decarbonized electricity)”; (2) “for which near-term action
is required to make gradual deployment at scale possible over
the course of the transition (e.g. efficiency)”; and (3) “which
306 Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political
Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2014).
307 Id. at 15 (“Rather than looking for a single unified policy to address a difficult
problem, such as climate change, it may be more efficient to pursue a battery of ‘good
enough’ measures whose collective impact would meaningfully address the problem.”).
308 Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCIENCE
1170 (2015). Another approach to sequencing is based on the value of taking partial
measures now and making adjustments over time rather than adopting a complete
approach to a problem right away. In climate change adaptation, the former approach can
be appropriate if future outcomes are uncertain; uncertainty is likely to decrease over
time, and flexibility exists to take future action based on new information. Peter Linquiti
& Nicholas Vonortas, The Value of Flexibility in Adapting to Climate Change: A Real
Options Analysis of Investments in Coastal Defense, 3 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 1250008,
1250008-2–1250008-3 (2012).
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preserve future freedom of choice by encouraging the extended
use of existing facilities and/or systems (e.g. re-use of natural
gas networks to transmit renewable syngas [synthetic gas] or a
portion of hydrogen).”309 This kind of sequencing is an essential
part of any legal approach to deep decarbonization.310
3. Learning from Experience About the Efficacy of
Various Laws
One of the most basic things that can be learned from
leaders is what works and what does not work. This is how
states and the federal government learn from other states in
the United States,311 and it also reflects a basic lesson of the
study of comparative law at the global level.312 Laws that work
in one jurisdiction can be considered for adoption in another
jurisdiction with due regard for differences in legal and
political culture.313 Laws in one jurisdiction that do not work,
are too costly, or create too many unintended consequences,
need to be substantially rewritten or not used at all. Learning
from experience saves time and reduces reliance on behavioral
models or hypotheses that may not fully or accurately reflect
the gritty reality to which they apply. Learning from
experience also lets later-acting jurisdictions improve on the
laws employed by the leaders.
For example, a critical issue in ramping up the use of
renewable sources for electricity is maintaining reliability of
the grid. Base-load generating facilities that run all the time
are simply more reliable—the argument goes—than wind and
solar, because the wind is not always blowing nor is the sun
always shining. Yet Germany and California have, remarkably,
“both managed to lower average service interruption times in
their electricity grids while tripling the amount of electricity
DDPP 2015 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 84, at 36.
Sequencing also requires a good measure of adaptive management in the
development and implementation of climate change laws. Jan McDonald & Megan C.
Styles, Legal Strategies for Adaptive Management Under Climate Change, 26 J. ENVTL. L.
25 (2014). Although the DDPP is directed toward a goal of keeping global temperatures
below 2°C, it is appearing likely that more ambitious goals will be needed. If particular
legal or technical pathways to decarbonization do not work out, then alternative
approaches will be required.
311 See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania’s Implementation of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How “Cooperative Federalism”
Can Make State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 903,
904–07 (1986).
312 See, e.g., supra note 28 and accompanying text.
313 John C. Dernbach, Reflections on Comparative Law, Environmental Law,
and Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 279, 280, 282 (1998).
309
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generated from solar and wind.”314 The grid works, not because
intermittency is an easy problem to address, but because of
“targeted measures, ranging from regulatory mandates to
market-based incentives.”315 Government decision makers, grid
operators, and entrepreneurs in those jurisdictions have found a
variety of ways to manage the intermittent nature of solar and
wind energy, including storage and new services for balancing
supply and demand on the grid.316
Another example of an experience that could inform
lawmaking in other jurisdictions is provided by Germany’s
ability to facilitate solar energy development despite its
northern latitude; the region gets about as much sunlight as
Alaska and half that of California.317 Germany nonetheless is
able to make up for that by making it easier for developers to
finance, install, and get governmental approval for renewable
facilities, and easier to supply their electricity to the grid.318
Finally, Germany’s feed-in tariff is widely regarded as
the cause of the admittedly high prices that German residential
customers pay for their electricity.319 Yet an analysis of those
prices indicates that the tariff is responsible for only 21% of
residential rates; that Germany’s strong legal support for
renewable energy led to a buildup of Chinese solar photovoltaic
manufacturing capability, which in turn has driven down the
price of renewable energy; and that German households consume
about half as much electricity as their Californian counterparts.320
As a result, German and Californian households pay about the
same on an average monthly basis for electricity.321 Because it
appears that the original feed-in tariffs failed to anticipate and
adjust to tumbling prices for solar panels and other hardware,
Germany has steadily reduced the amount of subsequent
tariffs.322 Still, the original tariffs are locked in for twenty years.323
Germany’s experience thus provides a variety of lessons to U.S.
lawmakers about the design and implementation of laws
encouraging the use of renewable energy.

314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Mormann et al., supra note 28, at 98.
Id.
Id. at 88–90.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59, 84–86.
See id. at 92.
Id. at 92–97.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 93.
Id.
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4. Coordinated Governance
A challenge faced by California and, perhaps to a
greater degree, Germany, is how to get a variety of different
levels of government working together in a coordinated way for
the same objective. A basic problem in achieving decarbonization
occurs when different levels of governance—international,
national, state, regional, or local—give inconsistent or conflicting
signals about what is desired or sought.324 The basic idea of
coordinated governance is an organizational framework in which
all levels of government are working toward the same
decarbonization objectives.325 Without such coordinated
governance, it will be much more difficult to accelerate the pace
of decarbonization.
As their experiences indicate, California, Germany, and
the United States all face challenges of coordinated
governance. California has been able to address many of these
issues through its national leadership position among states. In
many cases, California’s approaches have simply been adopted
at the national level, or California has been allowed by federal
law to adopt and implement more ambitious approaches.326 For
Germany, as its DDPP report indicates, the acceleration of its
deep decarbonization effort depends on much closer levels of
cooperation among all levels of government, including the
EU.327 In the United States, these issues are even more severe.
There are wide disparities among states in their support for
climate change; while many states are working to implement
the Clean Power Plan, many others sued to invalidate it.328 As
the Trump administration begins an effort to roll back
greenhouse gas mitigation regulations adopted during the
Obama administration, states such as California and New York
are threatening to stand in the way of that effort.329
324 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Weiss, Local Governance and Sustainability: Major
Progress, Significant Challenges, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 43, 50–53
(John C. Dernbach ed., 2009).
325 Coordinated governance can include hierarchical relationships among different
levels of governance, shared or collaborative governance, or other forms of coordination or
cooperation. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54
DUKE L.J. 795 (2005).
326 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
327 See text accompanying supra notes 209–215.
328 Bobby Magill, The Suit Against the Clean Power Plan, Explained, CLIMATE
CENT. (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-suit-against-the-clean-powerplan-explained-20234 [https://perma.cc/K6BK-PQVM].
329 Chelsea Harvey, New York, California Lead State Efforts on Climate
Change as Trump Retreats, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/newyork-california-state-efforts-climate-change-trump-retreats-580704 [https://perma.cc/2T
FR-2S2Z].

878

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

These coordination issues suggest an allocation of
decision-making and implementation responsibility that
corresponds to the strengths of each level of government. For
example, U.S. environmental protection laws are built on a
model of cooperative federalism by which the federal
government sets minimum standards and provides financial
support for enforcement and administration of those standards,
and states have the right to run programs in accordance with
those standards.330
These lessons from California and Germany are just a
starting point in capturing what the United States can learn
from their decarbonization experience thus far. But, they are
enough to demonstrate the considerable value of that
experience. While it is essential to have all levels of
government working for decarbonization, subnational
governments may help backstop decarbonization efforts when
there is a policy reversal at the national level.
CONCLUSION
The technical, economic, legal, and political challenges of
deep decarbonization in the United States seems less daunting
when one realizes that others are farther along than the United
States and are still thriving. Both Germany and California have
set, and are working toward, more ambitious and specific goals
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions than those in place in the
United States. Their laws are also more far-reaching than those
in the United States. Lessons from the actual experiences of
California and Germany provide a sound starting point for the
further development of U.S. laws. If the United States wants to
take an international lead in decarbonizing its economy, and
reap the considerable benefits that would bring, it should build
on what has already been learned.
These lessons fall into two groups. The first concerns
enabling conditions and frames. Perhaps the most key enabling
condition is widespread public support. Both California and
Germany have significantly higher levels of public support for
action on climate change than the United States. Because
decarbonization requires not only public laws but also private
actions, a high level of public support is needed for decarbonization.
Another enabling condition or frame is a sustainable
development approach. Essentially, sustainable development
provides a framework for addressing climate change that is
330

See, e.g., Dernbach, supra note 311, at 904.
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based on maximizing the economic, security, social, and
environmental co-benefits of laws to address climate change. In
so doing, it provides a basis for increasing public support for
laws and proposed laws, and for finding opportunity at a time of
significant risk. A final enabling condition, or frame, is longterm and sector-specific targets and timetables as well as
implementation strategies. These targets and timetables provide
a focal point for action as well as a way of measuring success
and failure; they, too, can be used to mobilize public support.
The second group of lessons concerns law and
governance. These include the value of laws as building blocks,
which means that multiple laws are needed to achieve
decarbonization; stand-alone silver bullets like a carbon tax are
unlikely to succeed by themselves. Sequencing of laws over time
is also an essential lesson; each of these jurisdictions, including
the United States, has built its existing system of laws over
decades, making changes as circumstances and apparent public
need dictate. Another lesson is simply a reflection of domestic
and international comparative law; the experience of individual
jurisdictions provides a useful source of information for what
works and what does not work. And a final lesson is the value of
coordinated governance—making sure that all levels of
governance in a jurisdiction are working toward the same
decarbonization objectives with mutually reinforcing laws.
These lessons are not exhaustive. A more detailed
examination of particular aspects of Germany’s and California’s
experiences, respectively, would no doubt yield other lessons. Still,
at a time of enormous risk and potentially enormous opportunity,
these lessons shed some light on the legal pathways that are
needed to decarbonize the U.S. economy. Whether the U.S.
government is willing to heed these lessons, of course, remains
to be seen.

